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Abstract 
Organizations commonly provide relative performance information (RPI) as part of their 
management control systems to motivate employees. Despite the benefits of RPI that have 
been well-documented in the literature, RPI can lead to unhealthy competition where 
employees sabotage their co-workers’ performance so as to outperform, and thus be ranked 
higher than their co-workers. Organizations could strengthen group identity, an informal 
management control, to reduce sabotage. However, there is limited previous evidence that 
strengthening group identity actually reduces sabotage. This study aims to fill that gap. 
Additionally, this study investigates whether the effect of strengthening group identity 
depends on the type of compensation contract assigned. I used an experiment in a laboratory 
setting because it is difficult to observe incidences of employee sabotage behavior in real 
organizations since sabotage is often conducted covertly and concealed carefully. I 
manipulate compensation type at two levels (piece rate versus flat wage), and group identity 
at two levels (strong versus moderate). Both sabotage and effort are measured as dependent 
variables. I find evidence that strengthening group identity increase sabotage. In addition, I 
predict and find that employees sabotage co-workers to a greater extent under a piece-rate 
contract than under a flat wage contract. However, my results do not support the arguments 
that the effect of strengthening group identity on sabotage depends on compensation type. In 
addition, although I find that suspicion of having been sabotaged by others increases the 
frequency at which employees sabotage others, I find mixed evidence on whether the 
suspicion of having been sabotaged affects employees’ effort. 
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Organizations often use relative performance information (RPI) as part of their 
management control and incentive systems (Hannan et al., 2013a; Luft, 2016; Nordstrom et al., 
1990).  One example of the use of RPI is a forced ranking system for employee performance 
evaluations, adopted by many large corporations. Under forced ranking systems, relative (not 
absolute) performance serves as the basis of performance evaluation.  Literature has shown that 
providing employees with relative performance information that is not linked to performance 
evaluation can increase competition among employees who care about their ranking status 
(Hannan et al., 2008b).  Linking relative performance to compensation also fosters further 
competition among employees (Luft, 2016), motivating employees to increase productive effort 
and hence performance. As such, the value of the firm is improved (Kerr et al., 2007; Tafkov, 
2013).  
However, the “dark side” of RPI-induced competition is that it may spark hostile rivalry 
among employees (Charness et al., 2014).  As a consequence of this hostile rivalry, employees 
may sabotage the performance of their co-workers to increase their own performance rank. I 
adopt Lazear’s definition of sabotage as “…any (costly) actions that one worker takes that 
adversely affect output of another” (Lazear, 1989, pp.563).   For example, until 2013, Microsoft 
used a performance evaluation system where highly ranked employees received bonuses and 
promotions, whereas employees with low rankings feared losing their jobs.  This system 
encouraged employees to improve their rankings by sabotaging others.  According to Carlson 
(2015, pp.12), “Because someone would have to be ranked worst even on teams full of all-star 
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performers, Microsoft’s most talented employees refused to work together. Because employees 
were not judged on their own work, but on how well they did relative to their peers, they would 
actively seek to undermine each other.”  Indeed, an engineer from Microsoft reported that 
“people responsible for features will openly sabotage other people’s efforts”(Chowdhury and 
Gürtler, 2015, pp.136).  In organizational settings, employees may sabotage others to maximize 
their chances of winning a tournament to receive valuable resources or promotions.   
Sabotage can be classified into two categories: passive sabotage and active sabotage.  
According to Decision Wise research, 4% of a typical work force are active saboteurs, and 28% 
are passive saboteurs (Maylett, 2017).  Passive sabotage refers to those actions that should be 
taken, but are not taken by a worker, and the worker’s inaction negatively affects the output of 
another worker. For example, passive saboteurs may withhold important information from their 
colleagues or refuse to share knowledge with others. In contrast, active sabotage refers to actions 
that should not be taken, but are taken by a worker, and these actions are harmful to the output of 
another worker.  For example, an active saboteur may actively gossip about a co-worker, steal or 
hide a co-worker’s tools or destroy a co-worker’s work output (Robinson and Bennett, 1995).  
Passive sabotage has been examined by psychologists studying organizational citizenship and by 
management accounting researchers in settings where passive sabotage takes the form of a lack 
of cooperation including failure to help or share information (Berger et al., 2017; Kelly, 2010; 
Podsakoff et al., 2000). In contrast, active sabotage has been examined much less often in these 
two streams of literatures. It is important to investigate active sabotage although it is rarer in 
practice than passive sabotage because active sabotage sometimes causes more severe 
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consequences to co-workers or organizations (Laabs, 1999).1  
The focus of this dissertation is active sabotage behavior.  Sabotaging coworkers, 
although not directly targeted at the organization per se, can diminish firm value by decreasing 
the productivity of co-workers. If sabotaging each other becomes part of the organization’s 
culture, good workers may leave, incurring a talent loss to the organization.  It is therefore 
important to examine how to attenuate sabotage activities. The majority of existing literature on 
active sabotage has used experimental methods or theoretical models to study sabotage behavior 
during tournaments where RPI is linked to compensation (SeeAmegashie, 2013 for review).  A 
few recent studies have examined tournament settings and find that active sabotage also occurs 
when RPI is not linked to compensation (Charness et al. 2014; Wang 2016).  
Various policies have been proposed to reduce sabotage behavior.  In a labor tournament, 
sabotage activities can be decreased by carefully designing certain characteristics of the 
tournament such as the use of a smaller prize spread (i.e., through wage compression) between 
winners and losers (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008, 2011; Lazear, 1989). In a promotion 
tournament, sabotage activities among employees can also be attenuated by including candidates 
outside of their organization, who are too distant from other candidates within the organization to 
be sabotaged by them (Amegashie, 2013; Chen, 2003).  The inclusion of external candidates, 
especially those deemed competent, reduces all internal candidates’ chance of winning a 
promotion, and therefore employees (i.e., internal candidates) may find it less beneficial to 
                                                 
1 For example, active (passive) physical sabotage may take the form of spreading false rumors (not coming to 
meetings scheduled). Using cyber sabotage as another example, active cyber sabotage may be the execution of 
malicious code to delete critical files, while passive cyber sabotage may take the form of not submitting online 
reports in a timely manner.( eis, 2017) 
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expend resources to sabotage other internal candidates.  These policies mentioned above, namely 
the use of a smaller prize spread in a labor tournament and the inclusion of external candidates in 
a promotion tournament, are essentially part of a formal management control system. Firms can 
implement a control system to prevent, detect, and penalize saboteurs (Cappelli et al., 2006). 
However, it may be infeasible or too costly to use formal controls to decrease sabotage activities 
that are covertly conducted and carefully concealed.  Alternatively, organizations may use an 
informal  management control that might be more effective (Ouchi, 1977, 1992).  
Group identity is one informal management control that may affect sabotage behavior. 
Organizations often strengthen group identity of employees as an informal control to foster 
coordinated behaviors among group members.  Organizations can affect employee’s group 
identity with a variety of policies such as “job rotation, work group composition, the layout of 
the work space, and sponsored activities (e.g., sports teams, company gatherings, and retreats)” 
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2008, pp 212). Prior empirical results indicate that strengthening group 
identity interacts with formal control systems to influence employees’ actions (Kelly and 
Presslee, 2017; Towry, 2003). However, the effect of strengthening group identity on employee 
sabotage is rarely studied and not well understood.  
One exception is Charness et al. (2014) although they did not specifically set out to study 
the effects of group identity on sabotage and they made no predictions about the effect of group 
identity on sabotage behavior. However, these authors found that participants tended to sabotage 
their group members less if they were students at the same school than if they were students from 
a different school, and speculated that strengthening group identity may discourage sabotage. 
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According to social identity theory, strengthening group identity shortens psychological distance 
between group members such that group members are more likely to perceive others’ outcomes 
as their own, and are less likely to engage in sabotage behavior which hurts other’s outcomes. 
However, a competing argument would suggest the opposite. Strengthening group identity can 
increase perceived similarity among group members such that social comparison is heightened 
and sabotage is increased. To formally and directly examine the relationship between group 
identity and sabotage, my study directly manipulates and measures the level of group identity, 
and investigates how group identity can affect sabotage activities.  Given competing arguments, I 
make a null hypothesis that strengthening group identity will not affect sabotage activities.   
Previous literature suggests that the effects of group identity may depend on the nature of 
the formal control systems employed.  For example, Towry (2003) examined how group identity 
and two types of mutual monitoring incentive systems (either vertical or horizontal monitoring) 
jointly impacted employee effort. She found that strong group identity enhanced (weakened) the 
effectiveness of a horizontal (vertical) mutual monitoring system on employee effort.  This 
finding suggests that the effects of strengthening group identity depend on the type of formal 
control system employed.  In my study, I investigate whether the effect of group identity on 
sabotage depends on another formal control system element—the type of compensation contract.  
Specifically, I examine two different types of compensation contracts (i.e., flat wage and pay-
for-performance piece rate).  According to social comparison theory, people desire to be 
compared favorably to others, especially on those dimensions that are relevant to their self-
esteem.  Unlike those under a flat wage contract, individuals under a pay-for-performance 
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contract may compare their compensation to others and are more likely to sabotage others to 
achieve a higher relative income. I hypothesize that there will be more sabotage under a piece 
rate contract than under a flat wage contract. In addition, I predict that compensation type 
moderates the effect of group identity on sabotage. Specifically, the difference in sabotage 
between strong group identity and moderate group identity condition would be greater under a 
piece rate contract than under a flat wage contract. Previous literature has shown that when a 
financial incentive is provided, individuals are less relational, more psychologically distant from 
others, and more focused on self-interest.  Therefore, it is less likely for those under a piece rate 
contract (i.e., a form of financial incentive) to perceive others’ outcome as own, a perception 
through which strengthening group identity may reduce sabotage.  
I test my predictions with an experiment that uses groups with three participants. 
Participants individually work on a task and receive RPI—the performance ranking of all three 
participants in their group.  I use a 2 (Compensation type) x2 (Group Identity) between-subjects 
design. Compensation Type is manipulated at two levels, piece rate (PR) versus flat wage (FW),2 
and Group Identity is manipulated at two levels, strong versus moderate. Two dependent 
variables, employees' total sabotage and effort, are then measured. I do not find evidence that 
strengthening group identity reduces sabotage behavior. Instead, I find that strengthening group 
identity increases sabotage behavior. Moreover, I predict and find that participants working 
under a PR contract sabotage group members to a greater extent than those working under an FW 
                                                 
2 Although other types of pay-for-performance contracts exist in practice including merit pay, commission and 
bonuses, I use the simplest form of pay-for-performance contract because theory suggests that the effect I am 
predicting does not depend on the type of pay-for-performance contract. 
 
   7 
  
contract.  However, I did not find evidence supporting the prediction that the effect of 
strengthening group identity on sabotage depends on compensation type. 
In addition to the effects on sabotage, I also examine the effects of group identity and 
compensation type on effort. People’s willingness to put in effort may be related to their 
suspicion of being sabotaged (Carpenter et al., 2010), and therefore it is interesting to look at 
effort as well. My results provide mixed evidence that employees’ suspicion of having been 
sabotaged by others can motivate more effort.  
My study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, my study is part of a recent, 
but relatively small, stream of management accounting literature investigating employee 
sabotage behavior (Wang, 2016). Sabotage is common in organizations, and sometimes causes 
significant damage to organizational performance (Laabs, 1999). For example, Wang (2016) 
found that non-pecuniary recognition (e.g., recognizing top performers in company newsletters 
or public announcements) can motivate both productive and counterproductive effort (i.e., 
sabotage).  In addition, she found that recognition motivates more sabotage from those 
individuals who measure high on “Dark Triad” personality characteristics.3 While Wang (2016) 
identifies how public recognition program and personal characteristics can increase sabotage 
behavior, my study examines how an informal control (i.e., group identity) and a formal control ( 
i.e., compensation contract) affect sabotage behavior. To my knowledge, prior to my study, only 
Charness et al. (2014) have discussed a possible connection between group identity and 
                                                 
3 ese include Machiavellianism (a manipulative attitude), narcissism (excessive self-love), and psychopathy (lack 
of empathy) (Jones and Figueredo, 2013). 
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sabotage. Charness et al. (2014), in interpreting their results, speculate that strengthening group 
identity would reduce sabotage. My study contributes to the stream of literature by directly 
examining this relationship.  
Second, my study contributes to the literature on informal management control by 
studying the effect of group identity on sabotage. Previous literature has documented positive 
and negative effects of strengthening group identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2008; Bandiera et al., 
2005; Kelly and Presslee, 2017; Towry, 2003). For example, Towry (2003) examined how group 
identity interacts with mutual monitoring systems to impact employee effort. She found that 
strong group identity enhanced (weakened) the effectiveness of a horizontal (vertical) mutual 
monitoring system. Kelly and Presslee (2017) investigated in a tournament setting whether group 
identity interacted with the proportion of tournament winners to impact employee effort. They 
predicted and found that strengthening group identity led to less employee effort when the 
winner proportion was large, but it had no effect when the winner proportion was small. My 
study contributes to the literature by presenting direct evidence of the link between group 
identity and sabotage, a relationship which has not been previously studied directly.4  My results 
indicate that strengthening group identity does not reduce sabotage but it increases sabotage, an 
interesting result as it is contrary to the speculation of Charness et al. (2014) relying on indirect 
evidence.  
Finally, my study contributes to the formal control system literature considering the 
                                                 
4 Previous literature has studied positive effects of group identity on organizational commitment, discretionary effort 
from employees, and helping behaviour (e.g. Dawes et al. (1988)). Although these behaviours may be correlated 
with sabotage reduction, they are not direct evidence of sabotage reduction. 
 
   9 
  
impact of different compensation types on employee motivation and behavior. Recent literature 
documents that in settings where RPI is provided, but is not explicitly contracted on, employees 
sabotage co-workers to achieve a better performance rank when they are paid under a flat wage 
contract (Charness et al., 2014) and under a piece rate contract (Wang, 2016), both of which 
are contract types commonly used in organizations. In Charness et al. (2014) where 
employees receive a flat wage, they  sabotage others in the hope of achieving higher performance 
ranking. In Wang (2016) where employees receive a piece rate contract, they reduce other`s 
production to increase their own chances of being a top performer so that they can be publicly or 
privately recognized.  A recent psychology study finds that pay-for-performance contract, 
specifically a lump-sum bonus payment contract, interacts with individuals’ competitiveness to 
affect individuals’ interpersonal deviance behavior (i.e., active harming behavior toward 
coworker) (Gläser et al., 2017). However, prior research has not compared the degree of 
sabotage behavior between these two types of compensation contracts. My study identifies that 
greater sabotage is observed under a piece-rate contract than under a flat wage contract. This 
result is important to firms who are considering the various consequences of different 
compensation type. Although a piece-rate contract may increase effort relative to a flat wage 
contract, it also has the potential to increase sabotage. So firms may wish to consider how to 
counteract this potential increase in sabotage if they decide to implement pay-for-performance 
contracts. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 develops my hypotheses. 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 describe my experimental design and results, respectively. Chapter 5 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
I will begin this chapter by first introducing the research setting and the predictions under 
economic theory. After this introduction, I will present two literature reviews on identity and 
sabotage, which are then followed by hypotheses development under psychology theory. 
2.1 Research Setting and Prediction under Economic Theory 
In my research setting, I manipulate two variables: group identity and compensation 
type, with each variable at two levels. As a result, I create 4 between-subjects experimental 
conditions. Across all conditions, the economic benefit of sabotage is zero, and the economic 
cost of sabotage is held constant.  Therefore, the prediction under economic theory would be no 
sabotage behavior in any of the conditions. In my study, groups of three individuals receive RPI 
in the form of performance rankings of all three members in their group.  The ranking is based 
on net performance—the difference between performance and performance loss.  Each member 
can lose a fixed amount of performance with a varying likelihood that depends on a random act 
of nature and the sabotage choices of other group members.  Sabotage behavior takes the form of 
the choice made by individuals to increase their group members’ likelihood of performance loss.  
By sabotaging others, individuals may achieve better relative performance, but gain no economic 
benefit (i.e., earnings). In this setting, an individual’s pay is either based on individual 
performance (under a PR contract) or fixed (under a FW contract) instead of being tied to 
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relative performance. 5 Since individuals cannot increase their pay by sabotaging others, the 
economic benefit of sabotaging others is zero in this study.6 Instead, there is an economic cost of 
sabotaging that is held constant across all conditions. As such, the economic motivation 
for/against sabotage is held constant (the same cost and zero benefit) in all conditions. By 
holding the economic motivation for/against sabotage constant, my research setting allows me to 
focus on the psychological motivations for/against sabotage that are of primary interest in this 
study. 7 
Indeed, psychology theory predicts that sabotage activities may occur in my setting 
even though mainstream microeconomic theory would predict no sabotage based on the 
assumption that individuals are rational and always maximize their wealth and leisure. Prior 
research has challenged the assumption that individuals always behave rationally (Ariely, 2008; 
Simon, 1993). For example, using a multi-task setting, Hannan et al. (2013a) found that 
individuals did not maximize their earnings by choosing the optimal allocation of their effort 
between two tasks. Instead, they irrationally allocated more effort to the task in which they 
expected to do better than others. More direct evidence against the prediction under economic 
                                                 
5 A large stream of the literature on employee sabotage has focused on settings where employees’ relative 
performance (not absolute performance) is tied to their earnings (e.g., only employees whose performance is in the 
top percentile can receive a reward) (Amegashie, 2012; Falk et al., 2008; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011). 
6 It is possible for individuals to indirectly increase their pay by sabotaging others under the PR contract. e act of 
sabotage in response to sabotage by others may serve as a tool to ward off further attacks that reduce one’s 
performance (and hence economic benefit under the PR contract). However, this concern may be mitigated by my 
research design because participants never learn definitively whether they have been sabotaged or who the saboteur 
might be.  
7 Zero economic benefit from sabotaging others is not necessarily mapped into real world settings. Even so, I expect 
my results to generalize to real world settings where there are likely economic benefits to sabotage because the 
economic benefit is likely to have a main effect on sabotage. However, it is possible that the presence of economic 
benefits to sabotage may limit the effect of group identity under both PR and FW contracts. I acknowledge that this 
may be a limitation of my study which future research can examine. 
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theory comes from Charness et al. (2014).  Charness et al. (2014) found evidence that people 
were willing to bear economic costs for sabotaging others in pursuit of a better performance 
ranking. Both studies clearly indicate that when RPI is provided, individuals may sabotage others 
for higher performance rank, even when doing so is economically costly with no associated 
economic benefits.  
2.2 Literature Review on Group Identity 
The concept of identity is described by social psychologists as beliefs, values, norms, and 
personalities of a single person or a group.  Identity can be grouped into two broad categories: 
core (or individual) identity and periphery (social) identity.  Social identity emphasizes the effect 
of a social context on an individual’s beliefs, motivations and behavior. Depending on the social 
context, social identity can be further classified as professional identity, organizational identity, 
functional identity, group identity, cultural identity, societal identity, and so on. Social identity 
has been a popular topic in social psychology and organizational and industrial psychology 
(Dawes et al., 1988; Postmes et al., 2005). Accounting literature, in particular, has examined the 
effect of professional identity on auditors’ behavior and decision-making (Bauer, 2015; King, 
2002) as well as the effect of group identity on group members’ behavior and performance 
(Kelly and Presslee, 2017; Mahlendorf et al., 2014). 
Group identity refers to an individual’s sense of belonging and affiliation towards a group 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Turner, 1982). Group identity can be affected by office policies such as 
job rotation and team building activities. Strong group identity is indicated by a perception of 
belonging to the group, a feeling of a close relationship with group members, and interdependent 
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actions (Aron et al., 1992; Tesser and Campbell, 1982). Literature has documented both positive 
and negative effects of strengthening group identity (Bandiera et al., 2005; Hannan et al., 2013b; 
Kelly and Presslee, 2017; Towry, 2003). Management accounting literature, in particular, has 
documented that group identity may moderate the effectiveness of formal management control 
systems in regulating employees’ behavior and performance (Kelly and Presslee, 2017; Towry, 
2003). For example, Towry (2003) examined how group identity impacted the effectiveness of 
mutual monitoring systems in motivating employees to exert effort.  In the mutual monitoring 
system, the two agents in a group could observe each other’s effort choices (either “work” or 
“shirk”), but the principal could not. The two types of incentives examined in the study were a 
vertical incentive and a horizontal incentive.  Under both incentive systems, the goal of the 
principal was to ensure that both agents chose to work, not to shirk. In the vertical incentive 
system, the principal asked each agent to report independently about the other agent’s choice, 
and investigated only those reports about shirking. The principal rewarded (penalized) agents for 
their true (false) report of the other’s shirking. However, in this setting, collusion occurred when 
both agents chose to shirk, but cover for one another by lying to the principal about the other 
agent’s choice.  Towry (2003) predicted and found that strengthening group identity facilitated 
inter-agent cooperation, and their cooperation manifested itself via their collusion in this setting.  
As such, strengthening group identity weakened the effectiveness of the vertical mutual 
monitoring system. In contrast, in the horizontal incentive system, the principal paid agents 
based on the level of group output.  The best (worst) personal outcome was achieved for each 
agent when one agent shirked and the other agent worked (shirked).  The horizontal incentive 
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system was most effective from the principal’s perspective when both agents coordinated with 
each other by each choosing to work.  The author found that strengthening group identity 
enhanced the effectiveness of the horizontal mutual monitoring system, because strengthening 
group identity facilitated inter-agent coordination.  
Kelly and Presslee (2017) investigated in a tournament setting how group identity 
affected tournament competitiveness and performance when tournament winner proportion 
varied. 8  They predicted and found that strengthening group identity led to a lower level of 
tournament competitiveness and performance when the winner proportion was large, but had no 
effect on the level of tournament competitiveness and performance when the winner proportion 
was small. Their result is attributed to the fact that strengthening group identity increased 
individuals’ perceived overlap between self and others, which is the degree of psychological 
closeness between self and others (Gino and Galinsky, 2012).  Greater self-other overlap raised 
individual’s concern for others to the extent that they were willing to lower their own effort to 
increase other group members’ chances to win.9 
2.3 Literature Review on Sabotage 
Sabotage occurs in many contexts including political campaigns, wars, sports 
tournaments, and organizations.  Given the variety of definitions of sabotage that exist in 
                                                 
8 The tournament winner portion refers to the number of tournament winners as a percentage of total number 
of tournament participants 
9 Strong group identity results in greater self-other overlap because as one feels more affiliated with a group, one 
would feel psychologically closer to others in the group. However, self-other overlap can also occur in a non-group 
setting where there are only two people. For example, two persons’ self-other overlap will increase when they learn 
that both were born on the same date in the same year, and they are from the same city.  I indirectly measure self-
other overlap by asking whether they perceive other’s outcome as their own in this study. 
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different contexts, I follow Lazear (1989, pp. 563) to define sabotage as “any (costly) actions that 
one worker takes that adversely affect the output of another.” In business organizations, sabotage 
can be targeted at other employees (horizontal sabotage) or at management or the organization 
(vertical sabotage).  Although both types of sabotage are observed in practice, this dissertation 
focuses on horizontal sabotage.10   
Organizations typically consider sabotage activities to be highly undesirable and would 
punish saboteurs if they were discovered (Analoui, 1995). Therefore, these activities are often 
undertaken covertly and concealed carefully.  It is extremely difficult for researchers to collect 
reliable data concerning sabotage in actual organizational settings. Only a few researchers have 
surveyed and /or interviewed employees to collect data about their sabotage behavior in the work 
place (Ambrose et al., 2002; Harris and Ogbonna, 2006, 2012).  Researchers who are interested 
in sabotage behavior have proposed theoretical models to make predictions about sabotage 
(Chen, 2003; Konrad, 2000), or conducted experiments to capture sabotage behavior in a lab 
setting (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008, 2011; Harbring et al., 2004, 2007), or analyzed sports 
tournaments where sabotage behavior can be directly and clearly identified (Balafoutas et al., 
2012; Deutscher et al., 2013).  
A large stream of analytical and experimental literature has examined sabotage behavior 
in various types of tournaments (Amegashie, 2013; Chowdhury and Gürtler, 2015).  
Tournaments, which are commonly used in organizations, refer to incentive systems where 
                                                 
10 Vertical sabotage has been examined extensively in prior literature in organizational behavior (DiBattista, 1991). 
Vertical sabotage takes the form of employees’ collusion against superiors in the accounting literatures (e. g., Guo et 
al. (2017)) 
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individuals (or teams) compete for a limited number of rewards such as bonus and promotion 
opportunities (Berger et al., 2013b).  Tournament incentives are essentially contracts linking 
employees’ compensation to their relative performance (i.e., their performance relative to other 
employees). Literature has documented both positive and negative effects of tournament 
incentives on employee’s performance (Berger et al., 2013b; Hannan et al., 2008b).  Employees 
under a tournament incentive can be motivated to exert effort to improve their absolute 
performance (positive effect), and/ or reduce their competitors’ performance by sabotaging them 
(negative effect) (Chen, 2003; Deutscher et al., 2013; Gürtler and Münster, 2010).   
Existing theoretical models and experimental studies of sabotage in tournaments, 
proposed and conducted by economists, focus on the economic reasons for sabotage; that is, 
sabotage can bring economic welfare to saboteurs by increasing their chance of receiving a 
favorable outcome.  The size of the benefit (cost) of sabotage is positively (negatively) correlated 
with the level of sabotage behavior.  The greater the benefit, the more sabotage behavior is 
observed. For example, in a repeated tournament setting with three persons competing for a 
bonus (i.e., the difference in pay between one winner and two losers), a larger bonus (i.e., greater 
benefit of sabotage) leads to more sabotage effort (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011).  On the other 
hand, if the benefit of sabotage is sufficiently small, sabotage behavior may even disappear. In a 
lobbying tournament setting used by Konrad (2000) where multiple lobbying groups compete for 
a prize ( i.e., a favorable policy outcome), sabotage effort directed toward a lobbying group 
reduces that group’s chance of winning, thereby increasing all other groups’ chances of winning.  
This means that the benefit of sabotage is similar to a public good, shared by all other groups. 
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Therefore, when the number of lobbying groups (i.e., the tournament size) is sufficiently large, 
the benefit of sabotaging a specific lobbying group approaches zero to the saboteur.  As a result, 
a potential saboteur will not choose to sabotage others when the tournament size is sufficiently 
large.  Unlike Konrad (2000) where the benefit of sabotage is shared by all groups, Harbring and 
Irlenbusch (2008) propose a model where the benefit of sabotage is only received by a saboteur 
and remains constant regardless of the tournament size (i.e., the number of competitors in the 
tournament).  The authors predict and find that in such a setting, the tournament size does not 
affect sabotage behavior.  These studies consistently show that the economic benefit of sabotage 
is positively associated with the level of sabotage behavior. 
Contrary to the benefit of sabotage, economic theory suggests the cost of sabotage is 
negatively correlated with sabotage behavior.  When the cost of sabotage is reduced (increased), 
more (less) sabotage would be expected.  Balafoutas et al. (2012) used a sports tournament –the 
Judo world championships—to study how sabotage is related to the change in sabotage cost 
structure.  Effective in 2009, a change in the Judo rules “provided fighters with an opportunity 
for one costless act of sabotage” (Balafoutas et al., 2012, pp. 427). They found more sabotage 
effort in 2009 (post-change) than in 2007 (pre-change), suggesting that sabotage increased after 
the cost of sabotage was lowered with the change in the rules.  Because sabotage effort is closely 
related to the benefit and cost of sabotage, literature has suggested sabotage-reducing policies 
that decrease the benefit of sabotage, and / or increase the cost of sabotage (Chowdhury and 
Gürtler, 2015).  
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While economists have assumed that individuals are economically rational and mainly 
have a preference for wealth (i.e., economic benefits) and leisure, psychologists have 
consistently demonstrated that individuals also have a preference for social status (Festinger, 
1954; Garcia et al., 2013; Hagerty, 2000; Suls and Wills, 1991). In addition to monetary benefits, 
individuals may sabotage others to gain social status such as receiving public recognition (Wang, 
2016) and higher performance rank (Charness et al., 2014; Hartmann and Schreck, 2015).  Wang 
(2016), although not directly referring to the term “sabotage”, studied a setting where 
participants were provided with a costless opportunity to undermine the performance of their 
group members by taking away points from their group members. She found that employees 
sabotaged others more when there was a public program recognizing top performers than when 
there was not.  Similarly, Charness et al. (2014) documented that individuals sabotaged group 
members to a greater extent when they received the performance ranking of all group members 
than when they did not. Note that in both studies, economic benefits of sabotage were zero, as 
neither public recognition nor performance ranking status was linked to compensation in these 
studies.   
The form of sabotage cost is not limited to just monetary costs (such as time, money, 
effort, etc.).  Psychology literature has shown that individuals have a preference for conformity 
with social norms of honesty and fairness (Colquitt et al., 2001).  When sabotage activities are 
perceived by a saboteur as a violation of social norms, the saboteur may feel guilty or have a 
negative self-image after sabotaging others.  Such unfavorable feelings or other psychological 
effects experienced or anticipated by a saboteur as a form of psychological cost may stop a 
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potential saboteur from sabotaging in the first place.  Therefore, one potential way to reduce 
sabotage is to increase the psychological cost of sabotage.  For example, sabotage behavior can 
be mitigated by using  language that clearly labels destructive activities as sabotage (Harbring 
and Irlenbusch, 2011). Labeling destructive activities with the negative term “sabotage” 
increases the psychological costs associated with these activities as the term “sabotage” 
highlights that the activity is undesirable and violates societal norms.  Another form of sabotage 
cost arises from revenge or retaliation from victimized individuals.  When a saboteur’s identity is 
revealed, the likelihood of retaliation and the cost of sabotage increase, therefore sabotage effort 
is reduced (Harbring et al., 2004). 
2.4 Hypothesis Development under Psychology Theories 
2.4.1 Main Effect of Group Identity on Sabotage11 
An individual’s sense of belonging and affiliation towards a group is an indicator of the 
individual’s group identity. Strong group identity can increase the psychological closeness 
between self and others in the group, conceptualized as self-other overlap (Aron et al., 1992; 
Aron et al., 1991). Individuals with greater group identity are also more likely to perceive 
themselves as similar to others in their group (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Suls et al., 2002). 
Higher perceived similarity increases social comparison, because people compare themselves 
more with others who are more similar to themselves and considered as a good gauge of their 
own ability(Festinger, 1954). Increased social comparison leads to more competition where 
                                                 
11 A summary of the psychologic based theories and predictions and the reasoning behind each prediction can be 
found in Table 8. 
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people strive to do better than others (Garcia et al., 2013). Therefore, strengthening group 
identity may increase competition and therefore sabotage behavior of employees.  
However, a counter argument exists that individuals with greater self-other overlap are 
more likely to feel the outcomes of other group members as their own (Gino and Galinsky, 
2012), and therefore they are also more likely to protect others' outcomes by not sabotaging 
others.  This counter argument is supported by Charness et al. (2014) who find that people 
sabotage group members to a lesser extent if the group members are from the same school than if 
they are from a different school. They speculate that group identity is the reason for the reduced 
sabotage, but they did not hypothesize this relationship.  
As it is uncertain which of the two competing forces mentioned above would dominate, I 
make the following null hypothesis:  
H1 (Null form):  In the presence of RPI, strengthening group identity has no impact on 
sabotage. 
2.4.2 Main Effect of Compensation Type on Sabotage 
Empirical evidence supports that individuals may sabotage their coworkers to achieve a 
better performance rank when they are under the PR contract (Wang, 2016) or under the FW 
contract (Charness et al. (2014). I predict that there is more sabotage under the PR contract than 
under the FW contract and this difference is driven by the following three mechanisms.  
First, social comparison theory suggests that people often evaluate themselves by 
comparing “self” with others on certain dimensions.  A favorable comparison can enhance self-
esteem, especially if the comparison dimension such as income, ability, and academic 
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performance is important and relevant to one’s self-esteem.12 One’s income level can be a 
relevant comparison dimension because it represents social status. Solnick and Hemenway 
(1998) used survey data to demonstrate that people care about their income relative to others’ 
income (i.e., relative income). They found that half of surveyed respondents preferred to earn 
more money than others (i.e., better relative income status), even though this better relative 
income status was obtained at the cost of half of their absolute income. Hagerty (2000) showed 
that income comparison within a community affects community members' assessments of life 
satisfaction. Experimental research demonstrates that people who have anti-social preferences 
may reduce another's income to increase their own relative income (Fehr et al., 2008).  Social 
comparison on the income dimension may occur under the PR contract where people receive 
varying levels of income proportional to their individual performance.  The performance-based 
ranking they receive is essentially their income ranking. In contrast, social comparison on the 
income dimension cannot occur under the FW contract, simply because people earn the same 
level of income, that is, the flat wage. In other words, the PR contract provides an additional 
comparison dimension (income) that may be personally relevant to one’s self-esteem. Therefore, 
I expect that the intensity of social comparison will be stronger under the PR contract. 
In addition to the income dimension, the ability dimension is also relevant to one's self-
esteem.  Tafkov (2013) found that the intensity of social comparisons on performance is 
stronger under a PR contract than under a FW contract.  Participants were asked to solve 
                                                 
12 I recognize that comparison dimensions that are relevant to one person may not be relevant to another person 
(Major et al., 1991). For example, some people care about their academic ability relative to others, while others do 
not. 
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multiplication problems with three digit numbers in their heads. Performance in this complex 
task was jointly determined by participants’ ability and effort.  Therefore, performance 
differences could be attributed to either an ability difference or an effort difference or both.  
Tafkov (2013) argued that when participants were all motivated by the PR contract to work 
hard (i.e., the effort difference across individuals was relatively small), they would be more 
likely to attribute any performance difference to ability, believing that performance-based 
ranking better reflected their ability level. In contrast, under the FW contract where participants 
were less motivated to exert effort, they were more likely to attribute relative performance to 
an effort difference.  Because ability is important and relevant to one’s self esteem, the 
intensity of social comparison is stronger under a PR contract where ability is more likely to be 
compared than under a FW contract where effort is more likely to be compared.  I expect that 
this argument also holds in my setting; that is, the intensity of social comparison on the ability 
dimension will be stronger under the PR contract than under the FW contract. Overall, I expect 
that social comparison intensity is stronger under the PR contract than under the FW contract. 
Thus, I predict that there will be more sabotage under the PR contract than under the FW 
contract because sabotage can be used to improve one's relative status. 
Second, victims of sabotage may experience negative feelings such as anger, and may 
feel disadvantaged in their rank status. They may sabotage others as a way to vent their negative 
feelings and/or to narrow the disadvantageous rank position. For example, Bushman et al. (2001) 
find that people have the tendency to behave aggressively toward others to improve their mood. 
Kahneman and Miller (1986) show that people hold strong norms about fair allocation of 
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resources and will take actions to correct inequity.  People who are sabotaged and therefore 
experience production loss bear economic loss under a PR contract, but not under a FW contract. 
Therefore, I expect that people working under a PR contract will experience greater negative 
feelings, have greater motivation to vent such negative feelings, and are therefore more likely to 
sabotage others than those under a FW contract. Similarly, I expect that people working under a 
PR contract feel greater disadvantage in relative rank and earnings, and have greater motivation 
to reduce the disadvantageous relative rank and earnings by sabotaging others than those 
working under a FW contract. 
Third, a small percentage of people have an antisocial preference and derive pleasure 
simply from being nasty (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009; Zizzo and Oswald, 2001). Assuming that 
their pleasure level is positively associated with the level of damage they cause to others, I 
predict that these antisocial individuals may gain more pleasure from sabotaging under the PR 
contract where they can cause greater damage (including loss of both earnings and rank).  
Therefore, individuals who are motivated by deriving pleasure from being nasty may be more 
likely to sabotage under the PR contract than the FW contract. The three mechanisms 
consistently predict more sabotage under the PR contract than under the FW contract. 
However, it is still possible that there is more sabotage under a flat wage contract than 
under a piece rate contract. Because sabotage under a PR contract has a negative effect on 
victim’s economic payoff, a potential saboteur may feel more guilt and have a higher 
psychological cost associated with sabotage under a PR contract, therefore engaging in less 
sabotage. Another possibility predicting more sabotage under a flat wage contract is that an 
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individual can only distinguish him or herself under a flat wage contract via a higher 
performance rank (as opposed to a higher performance rank and higher earnings under a PR 
contract), and s/he may be more motivated to sabotage others.  Despite these possibilities, I make 
the following prediction based on the three mechanisms mentioned above: 
H2:  In the presence of RPI, there will be more sabotage under a piece rate contract than 
under a flat wage contract. 
2.4.3 Interaction Effect between Compensation Type and Group Identity on Sabotage 
I argued a null hypothesis in H1 that strengthening group identity does not change 
sabotage behavior because it increases “perceived similarity” and “self-other overlap” that have 
opposite effects on sabotage, and the net effect cannot be determined. I next predict that 
strengthening group identity is more likely to increase sabotage under the PR contract than under 
the FW contract.  Unlike the FW contract, the PR contract links pay to individual performance.  
Financial incentives can lead people to increase their focus on themselves rather than on others. 
Ma-Kellams and Blascovich (2013) found that people were less relational when receiving 
financial incentives. In their study, people made inferences about the emotions experienced by 
others in a videotape, and their inferences were less accurate when accuracy was linked to 
financial incentives. Vohs et al. (2006) documented that people who were primed with money 
were more likely to put more physical distance between self and other, and were less likely to 
seek help from others, or help others.  Therefore, when group identity is increased, individuals 
under the PR contract may experience a smaller increase in self-other overlap than those under 
the FW contract. In other words, the effect of group identity reducing sabotage through increased 
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self-other overlap) is weaker under the PR contract than the FW contract, such that group 
identity is more likely to increase sabotage through increased perceived similarity under the PR 
contract than the FW contract. I make the following formal prediction: 
H3:  In the presence of RPI, strengthening group identity increases sabotage more 
under a piece rate contract than under a flat wage contract.  
2.4.4 Main Effect of Group Identity on Effort 
In parallel with H1, the null hypothesis of H4 predicts that strengthening group identity 
does not have impact on effort.  Similar to my arguments for H1, individuals with greater group 
identity are more likely to perceive themselves as similar to other group members (Ashforth and 
Mael, 1989; Suls et al., 2002). According to social comparison theory, people are more likely to 
compare themselves with more similar (as opposed to dissimilar) others who are considered as a 
better gauge of their own ability (Festinger, 1954). Therefore, higher perceived similarity 
increases social comparison (Festinger, 1954), leading to more in-group competition where 
people aims at performing better than others (Charness et al., 2014; Garcia et al., 2013). 
Therefore, strengthening group identity may increase competition and therefore effort behavior 
of employees (Charness et al., 2014). 
However, a counter argument exists that individuals with strong group identity  have 
greater self-other overlap and are more likely to feel the outcomes of other group members as 
their own (Gino and Galinsky, 2012).Their self-esteem is less threatened (enhanced) if their 
outcomes are unfavorable (favorable) relative to group members' outcomes (Gardner et al., 
2002). This literature suggests that group members who identify more with their group will 
 
   27 
  
engage less in social comparison and therefore effort.  
As it is uncertain which of the two competing forces mentioned above would dominate 
the relationship between group identity and effort is unclear. In addition, the organizational 
psychology literature provides insight about how group identity affects effort. For example, prior 
research has shown that group identity is a predictor of workers’ job satisfaction (van Dick et al., 
2008), but the link between workers' job satisfaction and job performance is less clear 
(Iaffaldano and Muchinsky, 1985). I formally state the following null hypothesis: 
H4 (Null form): In the presence of RPI, strengthening group identity has no impact on 
effort.  
2.4.5 Main Effect of Compensation Type on Effort 
I predict that effort level will be higher under the PR contract than under the FW contract 
for the following two reasons.  First, individuals may be motivated by monetary incentives to 
exert effort. Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) argue that monetary incentives can motivate effort and 
performance. The PR contract provides a stronger monetary incentive (i.e., pay for performance) 
to exert effort than the FW contract.  Therefore, effort should be higher under the PR contract 
than FW contract. Second, in a setting where RPI is provided, I expect that the intensity of social 
comparison is stronger under the PR contract than FW contract, as I have argued for H2.  The 
stronger intensity of social comparison would translate into more effort under a PR contract than 
a FW contract. The hypothesis is formally stated as follows: 
H5:  In the presence of RPI, there will be more effort under a PR contract than under a FW 
contract. 
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Most prior research finds that effort is higher under a PR contract than under a FW 
contract in settings where individuals' performance depends only on their own effort and ability, 
not on the actions or choices of their peers. This hypothesis replicates prior research, in a setting 
where individual’s performance is negatively impacted by the sabotage actions or choices of 
their peers.13 
2.4.6  Interaction Effect between Group Identity and Compensation Type on Effort 
In H4, I argued that strengthening group identity will increase self-other overlap which 
reduces competition, and / or induces stronger perceived similarity that increases competition.14  
The effect of group identity on competition and hence effort depends on the relative strength of 
the two opposing effects associated with increased “self-other overlap” and increased “perceived 
similarity.” When the effect associated with increased “self-other overlap” is weaker than the 
effect associated with increased “perceived similarity,” strengthening group identity can increase 
competition and hence effort.  On the other hand, when the effect associated with increased 
“self-other” overlap is stronger than the effect associated with increased “perceived similarity,” 
strengthening group identity can decrease competition and hence effort.   
The strength of the competition-reducing (competition-increasing) effect may depend on 
the degree of self-other overlap (perceived similarity).  The lesser the degree, the weaker the 
                                                 
13 ere is also prior research about how helping and cooperative behavior improve individual performance(Tyler 
and Blader, 2003), but this is beyond the scope of my study that focuses on sabotage.  
14 Unlike self-other overlap, perceived similarity captures one’s perception on whether another person is similar.  
Perceived similarity may or may not increase self-other overlap. For example, two persons of the same racial origin 
will feel psychologically closer to each other (i.e., greater self-other overlap) when they met in a country where 
persons of their race is rare than in a country where the persons of their race is common. 
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effect is.  In H3, I argue that strengthening group identity increases self-other overlap to a 
smaller extent under a PR contract than under a FW contract.  Therefore, I predict that the 
competition-reducing effect associated with increased “self-other” overlap is weaker under a PR 
contract than under a FW contract. In H5, I argue that a PR contract motivates more effort than a 
FW contract because a PR contract offers a monetary incentive and a more intense social 
comparison than a FW contract. Consequently, I predict that the competition-increasing effect 
associated with increased “perceived similarity” is no different under a PR contract than under a 
FW contract.  As a result, strengthening group identity is more likely to increase competition and 
hence effort under a PR contract than under a FW contract.  Thus, I expect the effect of group 
identity on effort is more likely to be more positive under the PR contract than under the FW 
contract, and I make the following prediction: 
H6:  In the presence of RPI, strengthening group identity increases effort more under a 
piece rate contract than under a flat wage contract. 
  
 




3.1  Experiment Design 
I employed a 2 (Compensation Type: Piece Rate versus Flat Wage) x 2 (Group Identity:  
Moderate versus Strong) x 8 (Rounds) mixed-factorial experiment to test my predictions.15 
Compensation Type and Group Identity were manipulated between-subjects at the group level, 
while Rounds was manipulated within-subjects.  In addition, I used a baseline condition where 
participants received the treatments of Moderate Group Identity and Flat Wage, but they were 
not provided with the opportunity to sabotage group members. The purpose of the baseline 
condition was to establish the benchmark for effort level when there was no sabotage 
opportunity. I conducted 12 experimental sessions where participants were randomly assigned by 
the computer into groups of three. Session 1, 7 and 12 were for the baseline condition. Each of 
the other 9 sessions was randomly assigned to one of the two Group Identity conditions.  Within 
each of the 9 sessions, groups received one of the two Compensation Type treatments.  
Participants competed in performing a real-effort task (i.e., letter-decoding) against the other two 
participants in their assigned group for eight sequential rounds (Rounds).  Participants remained 
in the same group and the same experimental condition for all eight rounds.  In total, 120 
undergraduate students in 40 groups of three participated in my study. Table 1 indicates how the 
forty groups were distributed across sessions as well as across the experimental conditions. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                                                 
15 is study has been approved by Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. 
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3.2  Tasks 
I used Z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) to develop a program allowing participants to 
perform the main letter-decoding task on computers. Participants worked individually on the task 
for eight rounds and each round was two minutes long. All participants in an experimental 
session started each round at the same time.  Using a decoding key provided onscreen, 
participants decoded a letter into a number. Once participants accurately decoded a letter, the 
computer program provided them with another letter.  Each letter correctly decoded was counted 
as one production unit. During a round, participants’ cumulative production units (i.e., the 
number of correct decodes) for that round and the time remaining for that round were shown on-
screen in real-time. Participants had the option to spend their time reading brain teaser questions 
instead of decoding letters, although they were explicitly told that they were only paid for 
working on the decoding task. I provide participants with the option to read brain teaser 
questions rather than work on the decoding task to ameliorate the concern that participants in a 
lab setting may continue to exert effort on the decoding task to pass time despite a lack of 
motivation for the decoding task if they lack an alternative task.  
The task included the likelihood of a production loss of 11 units. In each round, each 
participant could lose 11 production units with a likelihood of 15% due to a random act of 
nature.  Participants could not change their own likelihood of production loss, but could choose 
to increase the likelihood of production loss for their group members.16 At a cost of 1 cent, a 
                                                 
16 I operationalize the sabotage behavior using participants’ decision to increase others’ likelihood of experiencing 
loss. A detailed review of other methods of operationalizing sabotage and why I chose this method is provided in 
Appendix D. 
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participant could choose to increase by 10% the likelihood of a group member experiencing the 
11 production unit loss.  All participants made these choices simultaneously before each 
production round started. Therefore, the likelihood of any participant experiencing a production 
loss in any round was 15%, 25% or 35%, depending on whether zero, one, or two fellow group 
members, respectively, chose to increase the participant’s likelihood of a production loss in that 
round.   In the baseline condition where participants could not increase group members’ 
likelihood of a production loss, the likelihood was always 15% (due to only a random act of 
nature).  After the two-minute production time elapsed in each round, participants were informed 
of their amount of production loss (i.e., either 11 or 0 units), but they did not learn their actual 
likelihood of a production loss for that round.17 In addition, they learned the amount of the 
production units they generated (i.e., the number of letters that had been correctly decoded for 
that round), and their final production units (final production units= production units – 
production loss). However, participants did not learn any production-related information about 
their group members except the performance ranking of all three group members. The ranking 
was based on the final production units of the three participants in the same group. Participants 
could influence their performance rank in two ways: by working hard to increase their own 
production units and by choosing to increase the likelihood of the other two group members 
losing production units.  Before each round, participants were shown all the ranking information 
of previous rounds.  In addition to production-related information, they also learned, at the end of 
                                                 
17 The computer program randomly selects a number between 0 and 1 (distribution is uniform).  The participant 
loses production units if the random number drawn is smaller than the likelihood of production loss for that 
participant in that round. For example, if the likelihood of production loss is 15% and the number drawn is smaller 
than 0.15, the participant will lose production units, but if it is greater than 0.15, no production units are lost.  
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each round, information about their earnings including the beginning balance, earnings of that 
round, costs of that round, and the ending balance.  They did not know the earnings of fellow 
group members. 
Before starting their decoding rounds, participants were required to answer correctly 
some information check questions to ensure that they had common knowledge of the task setting. 
These questions tested participants’ knowledge of the potential reasons for a production loss, the 
basis on which they were ranked, the costs associated with their choice to increase the likelihood 
of fellow group members experiencing a production loss, and how their pay was calculated.  
3.3  Participants 
I recruited 120 undergraduate students from a large Canadian public university to 
participate in one of twelve experimental sessions. Each session consisted of three to fifteen 
participants resulting in one to five groups, as illustrated in Table 1.  The mean (standard 
deviation) age of these participants was 18.1 years (0.81) and the number (percentage) of males 
who participated was 53 (44.17%).  The number (percentage) of students in their first, second, 
third and fourth year of study was 110 (91.67%), 7 (5.83%), 3 (1.67%) and 1 (0.83%) 
respectively.  In total, 88 (73.33%) participants were majoring in business, whereas 32 (26.67%) 
were majoring in Science and Business. 
3.4  Procedures 
Upon arrival for an experimental session, participants were greeted and seated at a 
computer.  The Z-tree program randomly assigned each participant a Group Number, a Group 
Member ID (i.e., A, B, or C) in the randomly assigned group, and a unique Participant ID. 
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Participants transitioned to another section of the room to experience their Group Identity 
manipulation.  Then, participants returned to their computers and responded to the three-item 
group identity questionnaire adapted from Kelly and Presslee (2017).  Specifically, participants 
indicated on a seven point Likert scale (1-strongly disagree to 7-strongly agree) if they were 
happy to be a part of their group (Happy), if they felt that they were members of their group 
(Belong), and if they liked their group members (Like).  After answering the questionnaire, 
participants began to read task instructions onscreen to learn about the letter-decoding task. 
Before beginning each round, participants were asked whether they would like to increase the 
likelihood of each of their two fellow group members losing production units in that round. At 
the end of each round, participants received private information about their own performance and 
earnings as well as the ranking of all group members. After completing the eight production 
rounds, participants responded to the same three statements about their group identity (Happy, 
Belong and Like) and other post-experimental questions. The program then told participants how 
much they earned for all eight rounds, and they collected their earnings as they left the room. 
3.5  Independent Variables 
My first independent variable, Group Identity, was manipulated between sessions and at 
the group level; that is, all groups in the same session experienced the same manipulation, which 
I adopt from Kelly and Presslee (2017). Participants in the Strong Group Identity condition were 
provided with more opportunities to interact and cooperate with their fellow group members. 
Each group was instructed to sit at the table on which a tent card displayed the matching group 
number.  The color of the tent card was unique to the group.  Each group received a booklet of 
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team game sheets, and the color of the booklet matched the color of the tent card.  Once seated, 
group members were asked to generate and record a group name on the cover page of the team 
game booklet. Groups then played a slogan guessing game where each group recorded the names 
of companies/products they guessed were related to 16 company/product slogans (e.g., “Zoom!  
Zoom!” - Mazda). The groups competed against other groups to get the highest number of 
correctly guessed company/product names and the winning group(s) claimed a basket of 
chocolate bars (valued at $15) to be shared between all group members. Playing a group game 
helps foster strong group identity through interacting and cooperating on a task, sharing a 
common outcome (i.e., the shared prize), and battling together against other groups (Eckel and 
Grossman, 2005; Friedkin and Simpson, 1985). Groups guessed 10 slogans and then returned to 
their computers to individually perform the letter-decoding task for the eight production rounds. 
To maintain the saliency of the Group Identity manipulation throughout the production rounds, I 
used the group's unique name when displaying performance ranking of each production round. 
Finally, once the eight rounds were finished, the groups returned to their group-game table and 
continued guessing the remaining 6 slogans.18 
Participants in the Moderate Group Identity condition experienced little interaction and 
cooperation with their fellow group members.  Group members sat together at a table with three 
                                                 
18 Four experimental sessions were assigned to the strong identity manipulation. The number of groups (winning 
groups) were 3 (1 winning team), 5 (2 winning teams), 4 (1 winning team) and 4 (1 winning team) respectively.  
Overall, 5 out of 16 (close to 1/3) groups who experienced the manipulation of strong group identity were winners. 
The slogan guessing game is used to manipulate the level of group identity before the letter-decoding task. The 
outcome of the game can affect group identity differently.  Group identity may be enhanced in the winning team, but 
weakened in losing teams. To prevent the game outcome from affecting group identity, I split up the slogan-guessing 
into two periods, which allowed me to manipulate group identity before the letter-decoding task, and to announce the 
game outcomes only at the end of the experiment 
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booklets of white-colored individual game sheets, one for each group member. All tent cards on 
the tables were in white. Therefore, there was no unique color for each group. Participants took 
part in the same slogan guessing game as in the Strong Group Identity condition except that they 
competed as individuals instead of as a group. That is, participants competed against all other 
participants in the room (including those in their group) for rewards. The top one-third of 
individuals in an experimental session each won a reward of chocolate bars valued at $5. 
Participants guessed 10 slogans before returning to the computers to perform the eight 
production rounds. After the eight production rounds, they moved to the designated section of 
the lab again to continue guessing the remaining six slogans. 
My second independent variable is Compensation Type. In each session, groups were 
randomly assigned by computer to either a Piece Rate contract or a Flat Wage contract for all 
eight production rounds. This manipulation was applied after the Group Identity manipulation. 
Under a Flat Wage contract, participants received fixed pay of $2 dollars per round. In contrast, 
under a Piece Rate contract, participants earned 5 cents for each final production unit they 
generated for that round.   
3.6  Dependent Variables 
My two main dependent variables are Sabotage and Effort.  Sabotage is the participant’s 
choice of increasing group members’ likelihood of experiencing a production loss measured as 
“0”, “1” or “2” corresponding to the number of group members whom the participant sabotages. 
Effort was measured using two proxies (1) as the number of letters correctly decoded in a round 
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by a participant (i.e., production units before deducting production loss) 19 (2) as related to the 
amount of time each participant spent on reading brain teaser questions in each round, with more 
time spent reading brain teaser questions representing less effort.  
                                                 
19 Unlike production units, final production units are not fully controlled by participants. Both a random act of nature 
and the choices made by fellow group members can affect final production units.  e focus of this study is on 
production units, which are fully controlled by participants. 
 




4.1  Manipulation Checks 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the between-subjects manipulation of Group Identity, I 
adopted the group identity measure used by Kelly and Presslee (2017). Participants responded to 
three questions (see Section 3.4 Procedures for the questions), first immediately before the start 
of the letter-decoding task (the pre-task measure) and then again after the end of the letter-
decoding task (the post-task measure).  Participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed 
with three items using a 7-point Likert-type scale with the end points labeled “Strongly disagree” 
(1) and “Strong agree” (7).20 Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the three questions 
captured a unidimensional construct in both the pre-task and the post-task measures, with all 
loadings greater than 0.78 and both eigenvalues (variances explained) greater than 2.45 
(81.58%). Further, both the pre-task and the post-task measures had Cronbach alphas greater 
than 0.88. Therefore, I averaged a participant’s responses to the three questions as a measure of 
Group Identity. Both the pre-task Group Identity measure and the post-task Group Identity 
measure in the Strong Group Identity condition were significantly higher than those in the 
Moderate Group Identity condition (Pre-task: 6.06 vs. 4.55, t=8.41, p<0.001; post-task: 6.03 vs. 
4.79 t=6.02, p<0.001)21. The manipulation of group identity appears to have been successful.  
                                                 
20 Unless otherwise indicated, this 7-Likert point agreement scale is used for the questions in the post-experimental 
questionnaire.  e levels from 1 to 7 correspond to the labels “Strongly disagree”, “quite disagree”, “slightly 
disagree”, “neither agree nor disagree”, “slightly agree”, “quite agree” and “strongly agree”. 
21 I created a variable of Difference by taking the difference between the post measure of group identity and the pre-
measure of group identity. I found that the average of Difference is 0.11, marginally greater than 0 (Z=1.47, p<0.1). 
is suggests that the group identity has increased after interacting with other group members in the letter-decoding 
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To manipulate the compensation types, the task instructions explained to participants how 
their earnings (i.e., compensation) would be determined. Participants under a Flat Wage (FW) 
contract received a fixed amount of earnings per round, whereas those under a Piece Rate (PR) 
contract are paid $0.05 for every final production unit (Note: final production units = production 
units - production loss units) that they generated in a round.  I used a multiple-choice question to 
test participants’ understanding of their compensation type prior to them starting the decoding 
task.22  Right after submitting their answer to the question, participants received a feedback 
message telling them whether their answer was correct or incorrect, and revealing the correct 
answer to those participants whose answers were incorrect.  Participants had to answer this 
question again until the correct answer was submitted. The result showed that 52.5% of 
participants answered the question correctly at their first attempt, and 46.5% of participants 
answered the question correctly on their second attempt.  This suggests that 99% of participants 
understood their compensation type after they were tested by this question.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to conclude that my manipulation of compensation type was successful. I had other 
comprehension check questions to test if participants understood the key features of the setting.  
                                                 
task. I ran a linear regression using Difference as a dependent variable and group identity and compensation type as 
two independent variables.  I found that group identity has a significant negative effect on Difference (Coef. =-0.49, 
t=-2.22, p<0.05).  I found no main effect of compensation type on Difference.  Further tests show that group identity 
has increased by 0.24(z=2.11, p<0.05) in the MI condition, and remained the same (Coef. =-0.02, z=-0.29, p=0.62) 
in the SI condition.   
22 The multiple-choice question was stated as: “Which of the following statements correctly describes your earnings?” 
a) “My earnings is fixed for each round, regardless of my production units. I earn 40 ECUs each round”. b) “My 
earnings are based on my rank in the group. The higher is my rank, the more I earn”. c) “My earnings are based on 
my final production units (i.e., production units – lost production units). I earn 1 ECU for 1 final production unit.” d) 
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Participants understood that they would work on the same task as the other participants in their 
group (i.e., the same decoding template, and the same sequence of letters to be decoded), as 
evidenced that 93.33% of participants answered the related question correctly at their first 
attempt.  94.17% participants understood that the final production units are the difference 
between production units and production loss units on their first attempt, and 90.83% 
participants understood that the ranking is based on final production units on their first attempt.  
84.17% of participants knew what factors affect the probability of experiencing production loss 
(i.e., a random act of nature and the sabotage decisions made by their group members.) on their 
first attempt, and 80.80% understood the cost associated with increasing the likelihood of a 
group member experiencing production loss on their first attempt. Overall, it shows that 
participants have a reasonable understanding of the features in my setting. 
4.2   Descriptive Statistics and Tests of H1 and H2 (Sabotage) 
Before the beginning of each round, each participant chose whether to increase the 
likelihood of each of his or her two group members experiencing a production loss.  I proxy a 
participant’s level of Sabotage in a round as the number of group members whose likelihood of 
experiencing a production loss has been increased by the participant in that round. The level of 
Sabotage of a participant in a round can be 0 (neither of the participant’ two group members’ 
likelihood has been increased by the participant), 1 (one of the participant’s group members’ 
likelihood has been increased by the participant), or 2 (both of the participant’s group members’ 
likelihood have been increased by the participant). In Figure 1, the mean Sabotage in each round 
is contrasted between the Piece Rate (PR) and the Flat Wage (FW) conditions (Panel A), and 
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between the Strong Identity (SI) and Moderate Identity (MI) conditions (Panel B). In Figure 1 
Panel A, mean Sabotage levels are higher in all 8 rounds in the PR condition than in the FW 
condition. Similarly, in Figure 1 Panel B, mean Sabotage is higher in the SI condition than in the 
MI condition in all rounds except round 7. Statistical significance of these differences is tested 
and reported in subsequent paragraphs. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Using Sabotage as the dependent variable, I next performed a multilevel mixed-effect 
ordered logistic regression to control the random effects of individual differences as well as 
group differences with multiple individuals nested in each group. I included the following 
control variables in the regression: PriorLoss, PriorRank, and PriorSabotage. The variable 
PriorLoss takes the value of “1” if a participant lost production units in the prior round. I expect 
that participants experiencing a production loss in the prior round are more likely to sabotage 
their group members in the current round because they are retaliating. The variable of PriorRank 
is a participant’s rank (either 1, 2, or 3) achieved in the prior round. I predict that participants 
who ranked second are more likely to sabotage than those who ranked third, because those 
ranked third have a lower expectancy for achieving the first rank through sabotage and thus, the 
incremental utility of sabotage is lower for third-ranked individuals. The variable PriorSabotage 
refers to a participant’s level of sabotage in the prior round. I expect that participants who 
sabotaged in the prior round are more likely to sabotage in the current round because these 
participants may innately be more prone to sabotaging others. In addition, I control the individual 
differences in concerns over economic cost and violation of personal codes, both of which can 
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impact a person’s tendency to sabotage irrespective of my experimental manipulations. The 
variable of Concern of Economic Cost is the level of agreement with the statement “In the study, 
I hesitated about increasing the probability of my fellow group members losing production units 
because it would cost me ECUs and reduce my earnings.” The variable is measured on a 7-likert 
scale with “1” representing “Strongly disagree” and “7” for “Strongly agree”. On the same scale, 
the variable of Concern of Violation of Personal Codes captures the level of agreement with the 
statement “In the study, I hesitated about increasing the probability of my fellow group members 
losing production units because it would be against my personal code of conduct, irrespective of 
how others regard such behavior.” I expect that individuals with higher level of concern over 
economic cost and violation of personal code are less likely to sabotage others. 
I used a subsample of 85 participants without including the 21 participants from the 
baseline condition who had no opportunity to sabotage group members and 14 participants who 
had opportunity to sabotage, but did not demonstrate their understanding of what factors affect the 
likelihood of experiencing production loss.23. The results are shown in Table 2. The odds of 
employees sabotaging others in the SI condition was 5.20 times that in the MI condition ( (95% 
CI, 0.89 to 30.46)), Z=1.83, p<0.1, marginal significance).24  This result rejects the null hypothesis 
                                                 
23 Before participants started their task, they were tested on their understanding and knowledge of this study. One of 
the questions was to test whether they understood what impacted the probability of a production loss. It is stated as 
follows: “In each round, what is the probability of a person losing 11 production units?” Four answers were 
provided (a) always 15% (b) always 25% (c) always 35% (d) 15%, 25%, or 35%, depending on the choices made by 
the person’s fellow group members.  e correct answer is (d). 85 out of the 99 participants answered this question 
correctly on their first attempt. Using a sample including only the 85 participants, I find that the odds of employees 
sabotaging others in the SI condition was 5.20 times that in the MI condition ((95% CI, 0.89 TO 30.46), Z=1.83, 
p=0.067). 
24 When using the full sample of 99 participants who had opportunity to sabotage, the result is weaker with p=0.110 
(the odds ratio is 3.95, 95% CI, 0.73 to 21.31, Z=1.60).  
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H1, suggesting that strengthening group identity increases sabotage. As to H2, the odds of 
employees sabotaging group members in the PR condition was 7.90 times that in the FW condition 
((95% CI, 1.53 to 40.66), Z =2.47, p <0.05).  Consistent with H2, this result indicates that there 
was more sabotage under a PR contract than under a FW contract. In addition, consistent with my 
expectation, the odds of employees sabotaging group members after experiencing a production 
loss in the prior round was 2.69 times the odds of those who experienced no production loss in 
prior round ((95% CI, 1.38 to 5.24), Z =2.90, p <0.01).  This result also confirms that the level of 
sabotage in the prior round predicts sabotage behavior in the current round. Specifically, the odds 
of employees sabotaging group members after sabotaging one group member in the prior round 
was 1.91 times the odds of those who did not sabotage group members at all in the prior round 
((95% CI, 0.97 to 3.74), Z =1.87, p <0.1, marginal significance). Similarly, the odds of employees 
sabotaging group members in the current round after sabotaging two group members in the prior 
round was 3.21 times the odds of those who did not sabotage group members at all in the prior 
round ((95% CI, 1.43 to 7.20), Z =2.83, p <0.01). Finally, as predicted, the result shows that 
employees’ prior rank can affect their decision to sabotage in the current round. Specifically, the 
odds of employees sabotaging group members in the current round after they were ranked second 
in the prior round was similar to the odds of those who were ranked first in the prior round (odds 
ratio=0.88, (95% CI, 0.43 to 1.82), Z =-0.34, p =0.735) (i.e., participants ranked second in the prior 
round are just as likely to sabotage others as participants ranked first). Consistent with my 
expectation, the odds of employees sabotaging group members in the current round after they were 
ranked last in the prior round was 0.54 times the odds of those who were ranked second in the 
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prior round ((95% CI, 0.27 to 1.11), Z =-1.67, p <0.1, marginal significance).25 (i.e., participants 
ranked last in the prior round are less likely to sabotage others than those ranked second in the 
prior round). 
In addition, when the Concern for Economic Cost is one level higher, the odds of 
employees sabotaging group members is 0.78 times less ((95% CI, 0.59 to 1.02), z =-1.80, p<0.1, 
marginal significance).  This result suggests that employees’ concern about the costs associated 
with sabotage had a significantly negative effect on their sabotage behavior. Similarly, when the 
Concern for Violation of Personal Code is one level higher, the odds of employees sabotaging 
group members is 0.53 times less ((95% CI, 0.37 to 0.75), z=-3.59, p<0.001). This result indicates 
that employees’ concern about violating their personal code had a significantly negative effect on 
their sabotage behavior. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.3 H3 Interaction Effect (Sabotage) 
To study potential interaction effects and for the convenience of discussion, I label the 4 
treatment conditions using the variable “Cell” with 4 categories: FM (Flat Wage/Moderate 
Identity), FS (Flat Wage/Strong Identity), PM (Piece Rate/Moderate Identity) and PS (Piece 
Rate/Strong Identity).  H1 takes a form of null hypothesis: strengthening group identity does not 
change sabotage. H3 predicts that unlike a FW contract, a PR contract limits individuals’ self-
                                                 
25 Further tests show that this result is mainly driven by the Piece Rate condition. e odds ratio of employees 
sabotaging group members are the same in the FW condition regardless of whether they were ranked 1st, 2nd, or third 
in the prior round. is confirms with my argument for H2 that ranking status are more likely to induce sabotage in 
the PR condition than in the FW condition. 
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expansion to include others as part of self, and therefore strengthening group identity should 
have a more positive effect on sabotage under a PR contract than under a FW contract. This 
prediction of an additive interaction can be expressed using the odds ratio of sabotage as follows: 
Odds ratio [FS]-Odds ratio [FM] < Odds ratio [PS] – Odds ratio [PM] or equivalently Odds 
Ratio [PS] - Odds Ratio [PM]-Odds Ratio [FS] +Odds Ratio [FM] >0, where Odds Ratio [FM] 
=1 because FM is the reference condition in my analysis such that its odds ratio is 1.  Therefore, 
the direct test of H3 is to examine whether the value of λ is significantly positive, where λ = 
Odds Ratio [PS] - Odds Ratio [PM]-Odds Ratio [FS] +1(VanderWeele and Knol, 2014). After 
running the multi-level ordinal logistic regression discussed in session 4.2, I ran a direct test to 
see whether λ is significantly greater than zero.  I found no evidence to support H3 (λ= 1.10, 
95% confidence interval [-15.89, 18.09], z=0.13, p=0.90). 
4.4  Additional Analyses on Reasons for Sabotage 
To better understand participants’ motivation for sabotage, I listed in the post-experiment 
questionnaire five potential reasons for sabotaging, and asked participants to indicate their level 
of agreement with each reason on a 7-point Likert agreement scale (see Appendix C for details). 
I received responses from 50 participants who had sabotaged other group members at least once 
during the study.26  I considered that participants agreed with a reason if their response is 
between “5” and “7” inclusive indicating “Somewhat agree” and “Strongly agree” respectively. 
As shown in Table 5, the most prevalent reason was “I wanted to improve where I rank in terms 
of final production units” (33.3% for FW, 57.4% for PR, 49.0% for MI, and 43.8% for SI), 
                                                 
26 is question is not applicable to those applicants who have never sabotaged during the study. 
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whereas the least prevalent reason was “I believed my fellow group members had increased my 
probability of losing production units, and I was angry at them” (6.67% for FW, 13.0% for PR, 
11.8% for MI, and 8.3% for SI)27.   
Consistent with my expectation, results support my arguments for H2 that the intensity of 
social comparison is stronger under a PR contract where people care about how their earnings is 
compared to others’ earnings. 57.4% of participants in the PR condition have sabotaged others 
because they wanted to improve their rank in terms of final production units, a percentage that is 
significantly greater than 33.3% in the FW condition (χ2 (1) =5.72, p<0.05) Moreover, 40.7% of 
participants in the PR condition have sabotaged others to improve their rank in terms of earnings 
even though ranks are based on final production units.  This percentage is significantly greater 
than 17.8% in the FW condition (χ2 (1) =6.13, p<0.05). In addition, also supported is my 
argument for H2 that people are more likely to sabotage others under a PR contract where their 
concerns of outcome fairness is stronger. 46.3% of participants in the PR condition sabotaged 
others to make the final outcomes fairer as they believed that their fellow group members had 
sabotaged them. In contrast, the percentage for the FW condition (28.9%) is marginally less than 
that (46.3%) in the PR condition (χ2 (1) =3.14, p<0.1).  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
To explore thoroughly the reasons for sabotage, I also considered as a continuous 
variable their level of agreement with each of the five reasons listed in Appendix C, and ran a 
                                                 
27 As argued in H2, I expect that Piece Rate contract should generate more negative feelings such as anger.  Although 
the predicted direction is right (PR>FW), the percentage difference (PR: 13.0% vs. FW 6.67 %) is not statistically 
significant (χ2 (1) =1.07, p=0.3). 
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linear regression to see how the dependent variable (i.e., the level of agreement with a reason) is 
affected by Group Identity and Compensation Type. I argued in Chapter 2 that individuals are 
more likely to sabotage others because they are motivated to improve their earnings status in the 
PR condition vs. in the FW condition. I asked participants’ response to the following potential 
reason for sabotage: “I wanted to improve where I think I would rank in terms of earnings even 
though ranks are based on final production units.” I expected that participants in the FW 
condition would disagree with this reason because they all earned the same amount of wage and 
there was no difference in rank of earnings. On the contrary, I predicted that participants in the 
PR condition would agree with this reason because they received different amount of earnings 
depending on their performance and cared about making more earnings relative to others.  
Consistent with my expectation, the results show that participants’ level of agreement in the PR 
condition vs. the FW condition is 1.90 higher ((95% Conf. Interval [0.54, 3.27], t=2.80, p<0.01). 
In addition, I tested if the mean of participants’ level of agreement in the FW and PR conditions 
is significantly different from “4” – “Neither Disagree or Agree”. I found that the mean of 
agreement level in the FW condition is 4.12, not significantly greater than 4.0 (z=0.27, p=0.39). 
In addition, the mean of agreement level in the PR condition is 5.06, significantly greater than 
4.0 (z=3.96, p<0.001). These results support my expectation that participants are more likely to 
engage in earnings comparison and therefore sabotage under a PR contract than under a FW 
contract.  
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4.5 Additional Analyses on Reasons against Sabotage 
I also listed eight potential reasons for why participants may have hesitated to sabotage 
others. All participants were required to indicate the level of agreement with each of the eight 
potential reasons (See Appendix C).  In H1, I argued that strengthening group identity would 
increase participants’ self-other overlap, and it is possible that participants with more self-other 
overlap were less likely to sabotage others because hurting others is essentially hurting 
themselves.  To capture participants’ feeling of “others’ outcome as their own,” I framed one 
reason for hesitation as “hurting my fellow group members is like hurting myself.”   I expected 
that participants in the SI conditions would be more likely to agree with this reason than those in 
the MI conditions. Consistent with my expectation, a significantly higher percentage of 
participants who never sabotaged others agreed with this reason in the SI conditions than in the 
MI conditions (79.2% vs. 44.0%, χ2 (1) =6.38, p<0.05).   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.6 Descriptive Statistics and Tests of H4, H5 and H6 (Effort) 
4.6.1 Using Performance (Production Units without Production Loss) to Proxy for Effort 
In addition to the set of hypotheses on employees’ sabotage, I have also in Chapter 2 made 
hypotheses on employees’ effort. I presented a null hypothesis (H4) that strengthening group 
identity will not change employees’ effort. In addition, I predicted more employee effort in the 
PR condition than in the FW condition (H5). I used the number of letters correctly decoded in 
each round (i.e., prior to deducting any production loss) as a proxy for employee effort, and ran a 
multi-level mixed effect linear regression using the same subsample of 99 participants to test my 
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hypotheses H4 and H5. I have included Rounds as a continuous variable to control for 
participants’ performance improving due to learning.  
In addition, I control for participants’ intrinsic motivation in my regression because 
participants who are interested in the task and intrinsically motivated would be more likely to 
exert effort and achieve greater performance regardless of treatment conditions. To capture 
intrinsic motivation, I first asked for participants’ level of agreement on my 7-point Likert scale 
with the statement “In this study, I worked hard in decoding letters” (Hard Work). Those 
participants whose level of agreement to the Hard Work statement was 5 or more (94 of 99 
participants) were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the following reason for 
working hard: “I was interested in the decoding task” (Question A). The rest of the participants 
who indicated a degree of agreement on the Hard Work question of less than 5 (5 of 99 
participants) were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the following potential reasons 
for not working hard “I found the decoding task boring” (Question B).  The responses to this 
question were reverse coded.28  Using the responses to Question A and reverse coded responses 
to Question B, I created a continuous variable of Intrinsic Motivation.  I also control for the 
effect of the rank of an individual receives in previous round on his or her effort in the current 
period by including the variable PriorRank (defined under the section 4.2), because high ranking 
may motivate participants to work hard to sustain their ranking status, while low ranking can 
discourage participants from exerting future effort.  Moreover, I control for the effect of whether 
                                                 
28 Only 5 out of 99 participants have claimed that they have not worked hard, and therefore only the five persons 
were asked to answer question B while the rest was given with question A. 
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a production loss occurred in previous round on current round’s effort by including the variable 
PriorLoss (defined under the section 4.2), because prior loss may motivate participants to take 
more effort to recover from their loss from previous round.  
I consider participants’ sabotage behavior in a round may affect their effort level for that 
round. To that end, I included Sabotage (defined under section 4.2) to control this effect. 
Theoretically, it is unclear whether sabotage behavior will increase or decrease productive effort. 
If sabotage behavior and productive behavior are deemed as substitutes toward achieving better 
rank status, one may expect that participants would exert less effort after they engaged more 
sabotage.  However, if sabotage behavior and productive behavior are deemed as 
complementary, participants would exert more effort after engaging in more sabotage.  In 
addition to the inclusion of the main effect of Sabotage, I have included two way interactions 
(Group Identity × Sabotage) and (Compensation Type × Sabotage), as well as a three-way 
interaction (Group Identity × Compensation Type × Sabotage). 
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 3. Consistent with my expectations, I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis H4, because employee effort is similar in the SI condition and 
the MI condition (Coefficient = -2.43, 95% Conf. Interval [-6.34, 1.48], z=-1.22, p=0.22). 
Similarly, employee effort is not statistically different in the PR condition than in the FW 
condition (Coefficient = -0.39, 95% Conf. Interval [-4.10, 3.30], z=-0.21, p=0.83). This result 
does not support hypothesis H5, which predicts a significantly higher level of effort in the PR 
condition than in the FW condition. However, I found a marginally significant interaction effect 
between group identity and compensation type as expected (Coefficient=4.78, 95% Conf. 
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Interval [-0.57, 10.12], z=1.75, p<0.1). This suggests that H6 is supported. As shown in Figure 2, 
under a PR contract, the performance in the SI condition appears to be greater than that in the MI 
condition. Interestingly, under a FW contract, the opposite relationship is observed. That is, the 
performance in the SI condition appears to be less than that in the MI condition. 
Consistent with my expectation, I found that Intrinsic Motivation had a statistically 
significant positive effect on employee effort (Coefficient = 0.84, 95% Conf. Interval [0.11, 
1.56], z=2.27, p<0.05). This result suggests that employees can decode 0.84 more letters when 
their measured degree of intrinsic motivation increases by 1 level. In addition, as predicted, there 
is a statistically significant positive effect of Rounds on effort (Coefficient = 0.98, 95% Conf. 
Interval [0.82, 1.13], z=12.51, p<0.001). Additionally, in consistent with my prediction, 
individuals who received 1st rank in previous round are motivated to decode 1.43 more letters 
than those who were ranked 2nd in current round ((95% CI, 0.50 to 2.37), z=2.99, p<0.01), while 
individuals who received 3rd rank in previous round performed significantly worse than those 
who received 2nd (coefficient=-2.25, (95% CI, -3.23 to -1.28), z=-4.54, p<0.001).  Interestingly, 
experiencing a production loss in previous round can motivate individuals to decode 0.95 more 
letters to numbers ((95% CI, 0.00 TO 1.90), Z=1.97, p<0.05) than experiencing no production 
loss in previous round. 
I find a significant two-way interaction effect between Group Identity and Sabotage, and a 
significant three-way interaction effect between Group Identity and Compensation Type and 
Sabotage as shown in Table 3. To further investigate on these interaction effects, I divided my 
sample into two sub pools based on Group Identity and ran the analysis again within each sub 
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pool.  In the SI condition, participants under a PR contract decoded 4.28 more letters than those 
under a FW contract (95% CI, -0.50 to 9.05, z=1.76, p=0.08, marginal significance).  In addition, 
I found that sabotaging behavior is positively associated with productive effort under a FW 
contract, but not under a PR contract. This finding is consistent with the idea that under a FW 
contract, higher performance ranking is the underlying mechanism driving both sabotage and 
effort, and therefore sabotage and effort are positively associated. However, under a PR contract, 
financial incentives become a major part of the forces driving effort behavior, but not sabotage 
behavior, because sabotage behavior does not bring financial benefits.  In the MI condition, 
participants under a PR contract performed no better than those under a FW contract 
(coefficient=-0.30, 95% CI, -3.39 to 2.79, Z=-0.19, p=0.849).  Additionally, sabotage behavior is 
not associated with productive effort).   
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
4.6.2 Using Time Spent on Brain Teaser Questions to Proxy for Effort 
To further explore evidence in support of H4, H5 and H6, I use a second proxy for 
employee effort.  This proxy is related to the amount of time participants spent on reading brain 
teaser questions. At any time during a production round in this study, participants could read 
brain teaser questions for entertainment purposes at their own discretion. The amount of time 
spent on brain teaser questions by a participant is an indirect indicator of his or her level of effort 
on the letter-decoding task. As shown in Table 7, 20 out of 120 (16.67%) participants chose to 
read the brain teaser questions, and the cumulative amount of time they spent over 8 rounds 
ranged from 1.4 sec to 384 secs (or 6.4 minutes). A higher percentage of participants read the 
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brain teaser questions in the FW condition (22.73%, or 15 out of 66) than in the PR condition 
(9.25%, or 5 out of 54), p(1-sided) =0.04 (Fisher’s exact test). Participants who read the brain 
teaser questions spent on average 4.14 seconds (standard deviation=2.14) in the PR condition 
which is less than the average 118.67 seconds (standard deviation= 128.02) in the FW condition. 
An independent t-test shows that the difference is significant (t=3.46, p (2-sided) <0.01). These 
results suggest that participants were more motivated to work on the decoding task in the PR 
condition than in the FW condition, which is consistent with H5.  
I created a dummy variable for Effort which takes the value of “1” if a participant did not 
read brain teaser questions in a round, and the value of “0” otherwise. I ran a multi-level mixed 
effect logistic regression to formally examine the effect of group identity and compensation type 
on this second proxy for Effort. This analysis is similar to the one I performed in Section 4.5.1 
except that the dependent variable Effort has two levels (and hence logistic regression is used), 
while the dependent variable in Section 4.5.1 is a continuous variable (hence linear regression is 
used).  I found that the model fits the data better than the intercept only model (Wald χ2 (5) 
=9.92, p<0.1).  As shown in Table 4, the odds of employees not reading brain teaser questions in 
the SI condition were similar to the odds of employees not reading brain teaser questions in the 
MI condition (Odds Ratio=0.52, (95% CI, 0.08 to 3.79), z =-0.62, p=0.53). Therefore, I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis H4. The odds of employees not reading brain teaser questions in the PR 
condition were 12.32 times the odds of employees not reading brain teaser questions in the FW 
condition ((95% CI, 0.67 to 226.26), z =1.69, p<0.1, marginal significance), consistent with H5.  
A closer look at those 13 participants who actually read brain teaser questions shows that these 
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participants also spent more time in reading those questions in the FW condition than those in the 
PR condition did (F(1,12)=3.81, p<0.1, marginal significance).29  Therefore, these results 
support H5.  I ran the same direct test on the interaction effect as the test performed in Section 
4.3. I examined whether the value of λ is significantly positive, where λ = Odds Ratio [PS] - 
Odds Ratio [PM]-Odds Ratio [FS] +1(VanderWeele and Knol, 2014).  I found no evidence in 
support for H6 (λ= -10.40, 95% confidence interval [-45.68, 24.88], z=-0.58, p=0.563).   
[Insert Table 4] 
Overall, the results of my analysis show that I cannot reject the null hypothesis H4.  H5 is 
supported when time spent on brain teaser questions is used as a proxy for effort, but not 
supported when the number of letters correctly decoded is used as a proxy for effort.  There is 
some evidence to support H6 when using the number of letters correctly decoded as a proxy for 
effort. 
4.7 The Effects of Suspicion of Being Sabotaged in a Prior Round on Sabotage and Effort 
in the Current Round 
Participants in this research setting may experience a production loss of 11 units each 
round with a likelihood that depends on their group members’ choices. The likelihood of 
experiencing a production loss is 15% due to a random act of nature. The likelihood is increased 
to 25% (35%) if one (both) of a participant’s group members have chosen to sabotage them.  
Participants only learned at the end of each round whether they lost 11 units, but they were not 
                                                 
29 Similar analysis is performed, and untabulated results show that the average time spent reading brain teaser 
questions by participants in the MI condition is statistically no different from the average time spent in the SI 
condition. erefore, I am not able to reject the null hypothesis H4. 
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informed of the actual likelihood of production loss for each round so they did not know for sure 
whether the loss was due to sabotage. At the end of each round, participants were asked to report 
their estimations of the actual likelihood of a production loss in that round by allocating 100% 
among the three possible scenarios (i.e., 15%, 25%, or 35%). Participants’ allocations capture 
their suspicion of having been sabotaged in the round that they had just completed.  For example, 
a participant may assign the following likelihoods to the three scenarios: 50% to the Fifteen-
percent scenario (i.e. no saboteur), 0% to the Twenty-five-percent scenario (only one saboteur), 
and 50% to the Thirty-five-percent scenario (two saboteurs). Their Suspicion of being Sabotaged 
is measured by the expected number of saboteurs based on their assessments of the likelihoods of 
being sabotaged by 0, 1, or 2 saboteurs. In this case, the expected number is 1 (50% x 0 + 0% x 1 
+ 50% x 2).  
4.7.1 The Effect on Sabotage 
 I predict that participants’ sabotage choices in the current round will be positively 
associated with participants’ suspicion that they were being sabotaged in the prior round.  In 
addition, as I argued for H2, the effect of suspicion of being sabotaged on subsequent sabotage 
behavior is expected to be stronger in the PR condition than in the FW condition.  To test 
whether this is the case, I repeated the same analysis from Section 4.2 with the inclusion of a 
continuous variable Suspicion of being Sabotaged (this variable is defined in Section 4.7) and an 
interaction term Suspicion of being Sabotaged × Compensation Type.  I found that consistent 
with my expectation, when the participant’s suspicion of being sabotaged by group members in 
the prior round increased by “1”, the odds of people sabotaging others in the current round 
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increased by 7.9 times ((95% CI, 2.46 to 25.54), z =3.46, p<=0.001). Contrary to this 
expectation, the coefficient on the interaction term Suspicion of being Sabotaged × 
Compensation Type is negative (Coefficient=-2.10, (95% CI, -3.56 to -0.64), z =-2.83, p<0.01), 
suggesting that for employees in the PR condition, the effect of suspicion of being sabotaged in a 
prior round on their decision to sabotage in the current round is weaker than for employees in the 
FW condition. All results discussed in Section 4.2 still hold with the inclusion of the new 
variables of this section.30  
4.7.2 The Effect on Effort  
This study asked an open research question of whether participants’ suspicion of having 
been sabotaged would affect their effort.  I have two approaches to addressing this question. The 
first approach allows me to test the research question directly.  I included one extra independent 
variable Suspicion of being Sabotaged into the model discussed in Section 4.6.1 where 
performance (i.e., production units before deduction of production loss units) is used as the 
proxy for Effort - the dependent variable. I found that all the results discussed in Section 4.6.1 
still hold. I also found that Suspicion of being Sabotaged in the prior round motivated employee 
effort in the current round. When their level of suspicion increased by “1”, employees decoded 
1.23 more letters in the current round (95% CI, 0.05 to 2.42), z =2.04, p<0.05). Similarly, I 
added Suspicion of being Sabotaged as an additional independent variable to the model used in 
Section 4.6.2 where the proxy used for Effort is related to the time participants spent reading 
                                                 
30 e odds of employees sabotaging others in the SI condition was 3.79 times that in the MI condition ((95% CI, 
0.79 to 18.12)), Z=1.67, p<0.1).  
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brain teaser questions. The results show that participants’ decision on whether to read brain 
teaser questions in the current round was not affected by their Suspicion of being Sabotaged in 
prior round (Odds ratio=0.54, 95% CI, 0.87 to 1.94), z =0.75, p=0.452). Overall, there is mixed 
evidence about whether suspicion of being sabotaged in a prior round motivates employee effort 
in the current round. However, this approach might suffer from the reverse causality concern. It 
is possible that individuals with higher level of effort and performance are more likely to 
perceive themselves as targets of sabotage. To overcome this issue, I consider using a second 
approach. 
The second approach tests the research question by comparing effort when employees have 
the opportunity to sabotage others versus when employees have no such opportunity. As 
discussed in Section 3.1, I included a baseline condition in my experiment which was similar to 
the Flat Wage & Moderate Identity (FM) condition, except that participants in this condition had 
no opportunity to sabotage others and were therefore free of suspicion that they were sabotaged 
by others.  Hence, participants in the baseline condition will have a zero level of suspicion of 
being sabotaged, whereas those in the non-baseline conditions will have some level of suspicion. 
I created a dummy variable Baseline which takes the value of “1” for participants who were 
assigned to the baseline condition (N=21), and assumes the value of “0” for the other participants 
who were assigned to one of the four treatment conditions (N=99). By comparing the effort of 
the baseline condition (with zero level of suspicion) and the non-baseline conditions (with some 
non-zero level of suspicion), I examined how varying levels of suspicion may affect employee 
effort. Using the full sample of 120 participants, I ran a multi-level mixed effect linear regression 
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to test whether there is a main effect of Baseline on effort. I continue to use Rounds and Intrinsic 
Motivation as control variables. I did not include Group Identity and Compensation Type as 
independent variables, because results as discussed in Session 4.5.1 showed that performance, as 
a proxy for Effort, was not statistically different across the four treatment conditions. 
Results indicate that the effort of participants in the baseline condition was not 
significantly different from the effort of those in the non-baseline conditions (Coefficient=1.01, 
(95% CI, -2.44 to 4.45), z =-0.57, p=0.567). These results suggest that participants’ perception of 
being sabotaged have no impact on their effort. The results related to Rounds and Intrinsic 
Motivation discussed in Section 4.6.1 still hold. Moreover, I repeated this analysis to investigate 
whether results change when controlling for the treatment effects of Group Identity and 
Compensation Type.  To that end, I compared the baseline condition (i.e., Flat Wage & Moderate 
Identity, with no sabotage opportunity) to only the Flat Wage & Moderate Identity condition 
(with sabotage opportunity). I found that the effort of participants in the baseline condition was 
not significantly different from that in the Flat Wage & Moderate Identity condition 
(Coefficient=1.34, (95% CI, -2.53 to 5.22), z =-0.68, p=0.498).  Interestingly, as shown in Table 
7, there are 7 out of 21 participants or 33.33% of participants in the baseline condition had 
chosen to read brain teaser questions, but only 4 out of 24 or 16.67% of participants in the Flat 
Wage & Moderate Identity condition (with sabotage opportunity) did so, although the percentage 
difference is not statistically significant (χ2 (1) =1.68, p=0.19). 
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4.8 Additional Analysis—the Effect of Dark Triad Personality on Sabotage 
Previous literature has documented that the dark triad personality (i.e., those with high 
levels of trait Machiavellianism, Psychopathy, and Narcissism) may interact with organizational 
characteristics to impact employee sabotage behavior (Wang, 2016).  Before conducting this lab 
study, I collected data on dark triad personality from participants through the Qualtrics online 
survey platform. In the survey, participants were required to answer the 12-item Dark Triad 
Personality questionnaire (Jonason and Webster, 2010), to provide their demographic 
information and to work on a distractor task.31  Following Wang (2016), I measured the Dark 
Triad Score using the average of their responses on my 7-point Likert scale to the 12 items in the 
Dark Triad Personality questionnaire.32 The mean (standard deviation) of Dark Triad Score is 
3.70 (0.82) with the minimum (maximum) score of 2 (5.58).  These statistics are comparable to 
those in Wang (2016) where the reported dark triad score of her participants range from 1.25 to 
5.83, with the mean (median) of 3.36 (3.50).  
I added Dark Triad Score, Dark Triad Score × Group Identity, and Dark Triad Score × 
Compensation Type to the model discussed in Section 4.2. I found no main effect of Dark Triad 
Score on employee’s sabotage in my setting where RPI is provided.  This result is consistent 
with that of Wang (2016) documenting that Dark Triad personality has no main effect on 
employee’s sabotage. I expect that there is an interaction effect between Dark Triad Score and 
                                                 
31 Participants’ exposure to the 12-item questionnaire may affect their responses in the main task.  To address this 
concern, I asked them to work on a distractor task right after the 12 questions so that their attention was distracted 
away from the 12 questions.  To further distract participants, I invited to the lab only those participants who had 
completed the online survey a minimum of 7 days before their scheduled participation day. 
32 Note that a higher score corresponds to a more dark-triad oriented personality. 
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Group Identity. Specifically, the effect of strengthening group identity on sabotage is weaker for 
employees with higher Dark Triad Score because Dark Triad Score is positively associated with 
their innate tendency to sabotage others, and negatively associated with their sensitivity to 
external factors such as the strength of group identity. Contrary to this expectation, results show 
that there is no interaction effect between Dark Triad Score and Group Identity.3334 In addition, 
there is no interaction effect between Dark Triad Score and Compensation Type.    
  
                                                 
33 I also created a dummy variable to divide the participants into a high Dark Triad group and a low Dark Triad 
Group. e variable takes the value of “1” if their Dark Triad Score is greater than the median score of the sample 
population, and the value of “0” if otherwise. I repeated the same analysis and found that results remain the same. 
34 e results are inconsistent with my expectation. One possible explanation is that my sample size is small. In 
psychological literature studying the effect of personalities such as Dark Triad, it is often the case that several 
hundreds of participants are used. 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1.1 Results and Discussions 
Organizations often use relative performance information (RPI) as part of their 
management control system to motivate employees.  However, the use of RPI may lead to an 
unintended consequence—rivalry among employees.  Employees who desire to achieve better 
relative performance may intentionally hinder their co-workers’ performance, and this sabotage 
behavior of employees can impact organizational performance.  In this study, I examine how 
group identity, a form of informal management control, affects employees’ sabotage behavior.  
Although previous literature documented indirect evidence suggesting that strengthening group 
identity could reduce employee sabotage (Charness et al., 2014), direct evidence collected in this 
study indicates that strengthening group identity increases sabotage.  It is important to note that 
in my study, two levels of group identity are manipulated and compared: strong vs. moderate.  
My finding suggests that sabotage behavior does not change significantly when group identity is 
increased from “moderate group identity” to “strong group identity”.  However, the finding may 
not generalize to the setting where group identity is increased from a low level to the strong 
level.  It is possible that sabotage will decrease when group identity is increased from a low level 
to a moderate level, a range of levels of group identity that may not increase perceived similarity 
and therefore competition. Future research can examine whether strengthening group identity 
will reduce sabotage when a low and a strong level of group identity are compared.  If this is 
true, together with my finding in this study, it suggests that the relationship between group 
 
   62 
  
identity and sabotage is not linear. My study also investigates the effect of compensation type on 
sabotage behavior. Consistent with my expectation, results indicate that in the presence of RPI, 
employees will sabotage their co-workers to a greater extent under a piece rate contract than 
under a flat wage contract. This result provides important insights on how to design control 
systems (both informal and formal) to deal with sabotage, and therefore may be useful to 
managers who are concerned with employee sabotage behavior.   
 Previous literature has consistently documented a finding that individuals exert more 
effort under a pay-for-performance contract than under a flat wage contract in settings where an 
individual’s performance cannot be affected by co-workers (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002). I 
expect that this finding continues to hold even in my study where individuals’ performance can 
be influenced by co-workers.  Interestingly, I find a mixed evidence that more effort is observed 
under a PR contract when proxy for effort is whether participants engaged in an alternative 
activity (i.e., reading brain teaser questions), but not when task performance is used as a proxy 
for effort.  The discrepancy between my expectation and actual results may be due to my 
underestimation of the effect of sabotage behavior on effort.  My findings also suggest that 
strengthening group identity can elicit competition for performance ranking status, especially 
under a FW contract where a desire for performance ranking status drives both sabotage behavior 
and productive effort behavior, as evidenced by a positive relationship between sabotage 
behavior and effort. This is less of the case under a PR contract, because the most important 
effort driven force is the financial incentives, which cannot be obtained through sabotaging 
others. As a result, effort and sabotage are not positively correlated. This may explain why in a 
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setting like mine where individuals have opportunity to sabotage others, more effort is not 
observed under a PR contract than under a FW contract.  Further study can examine directly in 
the moderate group identity condition why effort under a PR contract is no different from that 
under a FW contract. Additionally, participants under a FW contract earned significantly more 
money than those under a PR contract, which is biased against my finding support for H5. I 
acknowledge this as a limitation of my study. 
I also investigated how employees’ suspicion of being sabotaged by co-workers can 
affect their effort. The results showed that the suspicion of being sabotaged has mixed effects on 
an individual’s effort. Suspicion of having been sabotaged has a positive effect on effort if 
production units is used as proxy for effort, but not if time spent on alternative task is used as the 
proxy. 
5.1.2  Limitations and Future Research 
This study examines a setting where sabotage behavior does not bring economic benefits 
to saboteurs. Such a setting is necessary for my study to focus on how non-economic factors of 
social identity and social comparison affect sabotage behavior. However, it is worth noting that 
in a real-world setting, sabotaging others may benefit saboteurs economically. For example, 
sabotaging colleagues may increase one’s chance of receiving limited reward such as bonus or 
promotion opportunities. Future research can examine how group identity and compensation type 
affect sabotage behavior in a setting where people are economically driven to sabotage others.   
In this study, I have successfully manipulated two levels of group identity (strong vs. 
moderate) by asking participants to play a slogan guess game before the main task. In a real 
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world setting, employees may have a low level of group identity. It is an empirical question how 
my results will be different in a real world setting where group identity may be at extremes 
(strong vs. low). Further research can examine this issue by having a stronger manipulation of 
group identity (strong vs. low) in an experimental study.  
Due to a small number of groups used in this study (33 groups in total), most of my 
analysis is based at the individual level rather than at group level.  Future research could examine 
how other group characteristics such as group size and group-level performance ranking may 
interact with group identity to affect the sabotage behavior at a group level.  Additionally, a 
potential future avenue would be to examine what the effects of organizational culture, 
organization norms, and tone at the top may have impact on sabotage behavior. 
I documented a main effect of compensation type on sabotage behavior in a lab setting 
where there are no repeated interactions among participants and no potential mechanism for 
detecting sabotage, and there is salient opportunity to sabotage others. In the real world setting, 
employees have repeated interactions with other co-workers, and organizations have mechanisms 
in place to detect sabotage. Therefore, employees may be less likely to sabotage others in 
general, and the effect of compensation contract might not exist or be weaker than what has been 
observed in this study.  
 Notwithstanding these limitations, my study has contributed to literature by providing 
direct evidence challenging the speculation that strengthening group identity reduces employee 
sabotage. Additionally, I have documented that sabotage behavior induced by RPI depends on 
the compensation type, and there is more sabotage under a pay-for-performance contract than 
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under the flat wage contract.  My finding also has implications in non-business settings such as 
education and sport groups. Educators and sport coaches should be warned of this cost of 
strengthening group identity, namely increased sabotage. The knowledge from this study will 
help educators and sport coaches make better informed decision as to whether they want to work 
on students or players’ identification with their groups.
 66 
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1b    2 
2 <3> <2,1>  
3 [5] [3,2]  
4 [4] [2,2]  
5 <5> <3,2>  
6 <4> <2,2>  
7b   1 
8 [4] [2,2]  
9 <4> <2,2>  
10 [2] [1,1]  
11 [2] [1,1]  










a: M=Moderate Group Identity;  
S=Strong Group Identity;  
PR = Piece Rate contract;  
FW =Flat Wage contract;  
 
b: Sessions 1, 7 and 12 were for the baseline condition. Baseline=M + FW, but with no opportunity to 
sabotage group members. 
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Table 2: The effect of group identity and compensation type on the Sabotage level (N=85, No. of 
observations=595) 





No. of Observations per Group 
Minimum Average Maximum 
Sgroup 33 7 18.0 21 
uniqueID 85 7 7 7 
 
     
    Wald χ
2 (10)=55.45 
Log likelihood = -319.95     Prob > χ
2=0.0000 
Sabotage b Odds Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Group Identity c 5.20 4.69 1.83 0.067 0.89 30.46 
Compensation Type d 7.90 6.60 2.47 0.013 1.53 40.66 
Group Identity × 
Compensation Type 
0.32 0.36 -1.02 0.310 0.04 2.87 
PriorLoss e 2.69 0.92 2.90 0.004 1.38 5.24 
PriorSabotage f       
Level 1 1.91 0.66 1.87 0.061 0.97 3.74 
Level  2 3.21 1.32 2.83 0.005 1.43 7.20 
PriorRank g       
Rank 1 0.88 0.32 -0.34 0.735 0.43 1.82 
Rank 3 0.54 0.20 -1.67 0.095 0.27 1.11 
Concern of Economic 
Cost h 
0.78 0.11 -1.80 0.072 0.59 1.02 
Concern of Violation of 
Personal Code i 
0.53 0.09 -3.59 0.000 0.37 0.75 
/cut1 -1.50 1.01 -1.49 0.136 -3.48 0.47 
/cut2 -0.05 1.00 -0.05 0.960 -2.01 1.91 
Sgroup  
Var (_Cons) 
0.00 0.00     
 




3.85 1.51   1.79 8.29 
LR test vs. ologit model: χ2 (2) =32.30                 Prob > χ2 = 0.0000 
a: A multi-level mixed-effect ordinal logistic regression was run to determine the effect of Group 
Identity and Compensation Type on Sabotage. Random effects are controlled at two levels [Group 
(Sgroup), and Individual (uniqueID)]. 
 
b: The level of Sabotage is 0 if neither of the participants’ group members’ likelihood has been 
increased), 1 if one of the participant’s group members’ likelihood has been increased, or 2 if both of 
the participant’s group members’ likelihood have been increased. 
 
c: Group Identity is manipulated at two levels (Moderate vs. Strong). 
 
d: Compensation Type is manipulated at two types (Flat Wage vs. Piece Rate) 
 
e: PriorLoss takes the value of “1” if a participant lost production units in the prior round.  
 
f: PriorSabotage refers to a participant’s level of Sabotage in the prior round.  
 
g: PriorRank is a participant’s rank (either 1, 2, or 3) achieved in the prior round.  
 
h: Concern of Economic Cost is the level of agreement with the statement “it would cost me ECUs 
and reduce my earnings.” on a 7-likert scale with “1” representing “Strongly disagree” and “7” for 
“Strongly agree”. 
 
i: Concern of Violation of Personal Codes is the level of agreement with the statement “it would be 
against my personal code of conduct, irrespective of how others regard such behavior.” on a 7-likert 
scale with “1” representing “Strongly disagree” and “7” for “Strongly agree”.  
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Table 3: The effect of group identity and compensation type on the Effort level (N=99, No. of 
observations=693) 




No. of Observations 
per Group 
Minimum Average Maximum 
Sgroup 33 21 21 21 21 
uniqueID 99 7 7 7 7 
 
     
    Wald χ
2 (16)=235.34 
Log likelihood = -2093.15     Prob > χ
2=0.0000 
Effort b Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Group Identity c  -2.43 2.00 -1.22 0.223 -6.34 1.48 
Compensation Type d -0.40 1.89 -0.21 0.834 -4.10 3.30 
Group Identity × Compensation Type 4.78 2.73 1.75 0.080 -0.57 10.12 
Round e 0.98 0.08 12.51 0.000 0.82 1.13 
Intrinsic Motivation f 0.84 0.37 2.27 0.024 0.11 1.56 
PriorRank g       
Rank 1 1.43 0.48 2.99 0.003 0.50 2.37 
Rank 3 -2.26 0.50 -4.54 0.000 -3.23 -1.28 
PriorLoss h 0.95 0.48 1.97 0.049 0.01 1.90 
Sabotage i       
Level 1 2.17 1.32 1.64 0.101 -0.42 4.76 
Level 2 -0.42 1.57 -0.27 0.788 -3.50 2.66 
Group Identity × Sabotage       
1 1 1.14 1.96 0.58 0.561 -2.71 4.99 
1 2 8.06 2.11 3.82 0.000 3.92 12.20 
Compensation Type × Sabotage       
1 1 -1.75 1.67 -1.05 0.294 -5.02 1.52 
1 2 -0.00 1.93 -0.00 0.999 -3.78 3.78 
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Group Identity × Compensation Type x 
Sabotage       
1 1 1 -1.45 2.50 -0.58 0.560 -6.35 3.44 
1 1 2 -6.89 2.68 -2.57 0.010 -12.15 -1.63 
_Cons 23.93 2.35 10.20 0.000 19.33 28.53 
       
Random-effects Parameters Estimate 
Std. 
Err 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
Sgroup  
Var(_Cons) 
3.28 4.19 0.27 40.11 
Sgroup>uniqueID 
Var(_Cons) 
30.78 6.25 20.67 45.84 
Var(Residual) 16.68 0.98 14.88 18.71 
LR test vs. linear model: χ2 (2) = 389.59                 Prob > χ2 = 0.0000 
a: A multi-level mixed-effect linear regression was run to determine the effect of Group Identity and 
Compensation Type on Effort. Random effects are controlled at two levels [Group (Sgroup), and 
Individual (uniqueID)]. 
b: The level of Effort is captured by the number of letters correctly decoded by a participant in each 
round. 
 
c: Group Identity is manipulated at two levels (Moderate vs. Strong). 
 
d: Compensation Type is manipulated at two types (Flat Wage vs. Piece Rate) 
 
e: Round is the sequence of the period during which an observation has been recorded 
 
f: Intrinsic motivation is measured by using participants’ responses to questions in the post-
experimental questionnaire, and the detailed explanation of how to measure intrinsic motivation can 
be found in Section 4.5. 
 
g: PriorRank is a participant’s rank (either 1, 2, or 3) achieved in the prior round.  
 
h: PriorLoss takes the value of “1” if a participant lost production units in the prior round.  
 
i: The level of Sabotage is 0 if neither of the participants’ group members’ likelihood has been 
increased), 1 if one of the participant’s group members’ likelihood has been increased, or 2 if both of 
the participant’s group members’ likelihood have been increased.  
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Table 4: The effect of group identity and compensation type on the Effort level (N=99, No. of 
observations=792) 




No. of Observations 
per Group 
Minimum Average Maximum 
Sgroup 33 24 24 24 24 
uniqueID 99 8 8 8 8 
 
     
    Wald χ
2 (5)=9.92 
Log likelihood = -88.62     Prob > χ
2=0.077 
Effort b Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Group Identity c 0.53 0.54 -0.62 0.532 0.07 3.92 
Compensation Type d 12.32 18.29 1.69 0.091 0.67 226.26 
Group Identity × 
Compensation Type 
0.22 0.40 -0.84 0.401 0.01 7.45 
Intrinsic Motivation e 1.40 0.32 1.45 0.147 0.89 2.21 
Round f 0.81 0.09 -1.97 0.049 0.65 1.00 
_cons 70.07 106.43 2.80 0.005 3.57 1375.37 
Sgroup       
Var (_cons) 0 0  . .  
Sgroup>uniqueID       
Var (_cons) 4.23 2.39   1.40 12.79 
LR test vs. logistic model: chibar2(01) = 25.62       Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
a: A multi-level mixed-effect logistic regression was run to determine the effect of Group Identity and 
Compensation Type on Effort. Random effects are controlled at two levels [Group (Sgroup), and 
Individual (uniqueID)]. 
 
b: The level of Effort is captured by whether a participant has read brain teaser questions in a round.  
c: Group Identity is manipulated at two levels (Moderate vs. Strong). 
 
d: Compensation Type is manipulated at two types (Flat Wage vs. Piece Rate) 
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e: Intrinsic motivation is measured by using participants’ responses to questions in the post-
experimental questionnaire, and the detailed explanation of how to measure intrinsic motivation can 
be found in Section 4.5. 
 
f: Round is the sequence of the period during which an observation has been recorded 
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Table 5: The percentage of participants who indicated a level (no less than “5”) of agreement with 
reasons for sabotage (The calculation of the percentages is based on the whole population). 
In the study, I chose to 
increase the probability 
of my fellow group 
members losing 
production units because:  













(1) I wanted to improve 
where I rank in terms of 













(2) I wanted to improve 
where I think I would 
rank in terms of earnings 
even though ranks are 














(3) … even if it did not 
change where I rank in 
terms of final production 
units or earnings, doing 
so simply made me 














(4) I believed my fellow 
group members had 
increased my probability 
of losing production units 
or would be doing so, 
and I did the same to 














(5) I believed my fellow 
group members had 
increased my probability 
of losing production 
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Table 6: The percentage of participants who indicated a level (no less than “5”) of agreement with the 
reasons for hesitance to sabotage based on the population of those who had never sabotaged at all. 
In the study, I hesitated 
about increasing the 
probability of my fellow 
group members losing 
production units because 
(select all that apply): 
Compensation Type χ2 (1) Group Identity χ2 (1) 
Flat 
Wage 




(a) it would cost me 














(b) it would be against 
my personal code of 
conduct, irrespective 
of how others regard 













(c) it would be 
disapproved of by 
people I am close to 
(e.g., my family 














(d) it would be 
disapproved of by 













(e) it would be 
disapproved of by 















(f) hurting my fellow 
group members is 













(g) I was concerned that 
doing so would 
damage my 















(h) I was concerned that 
doing so would 
expose myself to 
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Table 7: The amount of time spent on reading brain teaser questions in the four treatment conditions 
and baseline condition 
Total time (sec.) 
spent on reading 





Flat Wage a Flat Wage Piece Rate 
Moderate Moderate Strong Moderate Strong 
 .00 14 20 17 26 23 100 
1.39   1 (r8)   1 
2.23     1(r2) 1 
2.50     1(r6) 1 
3.35     1(r3) 1 
4.47 1(r2)     1 
5.13 1(r3)     1 
5.30    1 (r4)  1 
7.31     1(r1) 1 
8.99  1 (r8)    1 
19.53  1 (r7)    1 
24.04 1(r1)     1 
51.64 1(r3)     1 
79.17   1(r1,4,5,6,7,8)   1 
85.26   1 (r2,p3)   1 
108.62 1(r2,4,5,6,7)     1 
175.26  1 (r7,8)    1 
252.66 1(r1,3,8)     1 
263.37 1(r3,5,6,7,8)     1 
316.20  1 (r6, 7, 8)    1 
384.28   1(r1,6,7,8) c   1 
Total 21 24 21 27 27 120 
 
a: The baseline condition: Flat wage and Moderate Identity treatment, with no opportunity to sabotage 
group members.   
 
b: Left column shows the amount of question-reading time accumulated over 8 rounds.   
 
c: The information in the brackets always start with the letter `r`, a symbol for Round, followed by a 
number(s) indicating the round(s) during which a participant read brain teaser questions.  The highest 
time was 385 seconds, spent by a participant in the Flat Wage and Strong Identity condition in rounds 
1, 6, 7 and 8 
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Table 8: Summary of the psychology based reasoning behind the hypotheses 
 Psychology based 
predictions 














Under a PR contract, there exists an additional comparison 
dimension-Income dimension. As a result, social comparison 
and hence sabotage is stronger under a PR contract. 
H3 SPS-SPM    >SFS-SFM 
A PR contract limits the perception of others. Strengthening 












A PR contract is a form of monetary incentive, which 
motivates effort. As argued for H2, social comparison and 
effort is stronger under a PR contract. 
Self-overlap Sabotage 
Perceive other’s 
outcome as their own 
Perceive others as 






outcome as their own 
Perceive others as 
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H6 EPS-EPM    >EFS-EFM 
A PR contract limits the perception of others, strengthening 
group identity is more likely to increase competition and 
effort rather than decrease competition and effort. 
A FW contract limits the perceived social comparison, 
strengthening group identity may reduce effort. 
 
The symbols “S” and “E” represent “Sabotage” and “Effort” respectively.  The subscripts “SI” and 
“MI” represents “Strong Identity condition” and “Moderate Identity condition” respectively. “FW” 
and “PR” stands for “Flat Wage contract” and “Piece Rate contract “respectively.  The PS, PM, FS 
and FM represents the four treatment conditions: Piece Rate & Strong Identity, Piece Rate & 
Moderate Identity, Flat Wage & Strong Identity, and Flat Wage & Moderate Identity respectively. 
Under the economic-based theory, in my setting where there is no benefit but cost associated with 
sabotage, the prediction would be that sabotage levels are all the same across treatment conditions. As 
to effort, under the economic-based theory, there would be more effort under a PR contract than 
under a FW contract, but effort will not depend on the level of group identity. 
  
 




Figure 1: The mean sabotage in a round by compensation type (Panel A) and by group 
identity (Panel B).a 
 
a For a participant, Sabotage in a round is the number of group members whose likelihood of 
experiencing a production loss has been increased by the participant in that round. Sabotage 
in a round for a participant can take on the values of 0, 1 or 2.    
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Figure 2: Contrasting average performance (Round 5 to Round 8) of participants with strong 
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Appendix C 
Motivations for and against Sabotage 
This appendix contains the two questions I used to capture the motivation for /against 
sabotage in the Post-Experimental Questionnaire. 
I) Five reasons for sabotage 
 
In the study, I chose to increase the probability of my fellow group members losing 
production units because:  
 
(1) I wanted to improve where I rank in terms of final production units.  
(2) I wanted to improve where I think I would rank in terms of earnings even though 
ranks are based on final production units. 
(3)  … even if it did not change where I rank in terms of final production units or 
earnings, doing so simply made me happy (or it gave me pleasure)  
(4) I believed my fellow group members had increased my probability of losing 
production units or would be doing so, and I did the same to make the final outcomes 
fairer.  
(5) I believed my fellow group members had increased my probability of losing 
production units, and I was angry at them. 
 
II) Eight reasons for hesitating to sabotage 
 
e question was stated as follows: In the study, I hesitated about increasing the probability 
of my fellow group members losing production units because: 
 
(1) it would cost me ECUs and reduce my earnings 
(2) it would be against my personal code of conduct, irrespective of how others regard 
such behavior  
(3) it would be disapproved of by people I am close to (e.g., my family members, my 
close friends) 
(4) it would be disapproved of by society in general 
(5) it would be disapproved of by my fellow group members  
(6) hurting my fellow group members is like hurting myself  
(7) I was concerned that doing so would damage my reputation outside of the study 
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Appendix D 
Literature Review of Operationalization of Sabotage 
The sabotage concept can be operationalized using the lens of a four dimensional 
view: namely, target, damage, sabotage actions, and the costs. 
Targets of sabotage 
Sabotage may be targeted at a single contestant (s) (Charness et al., 2014; Harbring et 
al., 2004, 2007), or toward all other contestants (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008, 2011).  
When sabotage is directed at only chosen individuals in a multi-person tournament, a 
saboteur can choose to sabotage multi-persons at one time (Harbring et al., 2004, 2007), or 
only one person each time (Gürtler and Münster, 2010).  When potential targets are 
inherently different in ability, the more competent target(s) may be subject to more sabotage 
in an individual based tournament (Chen, 2003), but the least competent target may 
experience greater sabotage in a collective (i.e., team-based) tournament (Gürtler, 2008). 
Interestingly, individuals can even sabotage themselves in early rounds of a dynamic 
tournament to avoid outperforming others because performing better than others in early 
rounds can make them become the targets of sabotage in later rounds (Gürtler and Münster, 
2013).  
Damage of Sabotage 
In terms of the damages caused by sabotage, sabotage has been modeled to reduce the 
outputs of other contestants in a tournament setting (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008, 2011), to 
completely destroy the output of other contestants (Falk et al., 2008), to increase the marginal 
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cost of production efforts of other contestants (Amegashie, 2012; Harbring et al., 2004, 
2007), to disrupt the working process of other contestants (Berger et al., 2013a; Hartmann 
and Schreck, 2015), or to indirectly decrease the winning chance of a potential rival 
(Amegashie and Runkel, 2007).  
In Charness et al. (2014) and Wang (2016), a saboteur received or purchased a certain 
amount of points (no more than the maximum amount of point allowed) which can be used to 
sabotage others. Each sabotage point used by a saboteur can cause victims to lose one 
production unit, which reduced the victim’s pay and / or decreased the victim’s performance 
ranking. The maximum points of sabotage that can be used against a victim(s) in each round 
is 20 points, representing a maximum production loss of 20 units to a victim of sabotage in 
Charness et al. (2014).The maximum level of sabotage (i.e., 20 units) is significant to a 
victim,  compared to the average initial production of  25 units.  In Falk et al. (2008), 
participants were asked to decide between two options: “no sabotage” and “sabotage”.  If an 
individual decides to sabotage the other contestant from the same group, the entire output of 
the sabotaged contestant is destroyed. Two other studies provided participants with 
opportunities to interrupt others’ working process by freezing their competitors’ screens 
(Berger et al., 2013a; Hartmann and Schreck, 2015).  In Hartmann and Schreck (2015), 
participants can freeze others’ screens for 7 seconds at the cost of their own screens being 
frozen for 2 seconds.  Similarly, in Berger et al. (2013a), participants can freeze others’ 
screens for 20 seconds at the cost of freezing their own screen for 3 seconds. 
The cost of sabotage to saboteur 
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 Sabotage has been modeled as costly to the saboteur (Hannan et al., 2008a; Harbring 
and Irlenbusch, 2011) or as costless to the saboteur (Carpenter et al., 2010; Wang, 2016).  
For example, Carpenter et al. (2010) operationalized sabotage as a costless dishonest 
behavior of under-reporting other contestants’ quantity and quality of production.  In some 
treatment conditions of their experiment, the evaluations of quality and quantity of 
production can affect compensation, so lying can reduce others’ compensation.  Although 
lying is costless economically to liars in their experiments, they argue that “it does not appear 
to be costless from a psychological point of view”(Carpenter et al., 2010, pp. 507).  
If the sabotage act is modeled as costly, the question arises as to the forms of cost 
function for sabotage.  Would incremental sabotage demand higher marginal costs, in the 
sense that the cost functions of sabotage should be convex?  An increasing marginal cost of 
sabotage is supported by some theoretical models (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008, 2011; 
Konrad, 2000).  However, there are situations in the real world where the cost function may 
be concave.35  Charness et al. (2014) used neither a convex nor a concave function of costs, 
adopting a linear function setting the cost per sabotage point at 0.5 ECUS (ECUs is 
experimental currency).  Participants receive at the beginning of each round a fixed wage of 
10ECUs (equivalent to 1 euro).  The maximum sabotage points that can be used in each 
round is 20 points, which costs 10ECUs—the full amount of wage earned in each round.  
                                                 
35 For example, image that an individual takes a lot of time and much effort to come up with a “smart” strategy 
of sabotage, and plans to use it against one co-worker.  Because a lot of resources (e. g., time, effort, money) 
have been spent in developing the strategy, the cost of sabotaging the co-worker might be high.  Next time when 
the saboteur wants to sabotage another co-worker, s/he may not have to spend resources developing a new 
strategy instead s/he can use the existing strategy. As a result, his or her cost of sabotaging a second co-worker 
would be less than the cost associated with the sabotage targeted at the first co-worker. 
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This suggests that participants will end up with zero net earnings (wage minus sabotage 
costs) if they acquire the maximum 20 points to sabotage others, and they will never end up 
with negative earnings at the end of each round.  Falk et al. (2008) studied a two-person 
tournament where a person has a binary choice of “sabotage” or “not sabotage”.  If sabotage 
is chosen, all the output of the other competitor is destroyed.  The cost of the sabotage is 27 
guilders,36 and the wage is either 300 or 140 guilders depending on the treatment condition. 
As we can see, the cost of sabotage is significant, representing approximately 10% or 20% of 
the wage. 
                                                 
36 Note 100 guilders =0.12 CHF (1CHF~0.9 USA dollars). 
